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8 April 1966

THE SOVIET UNION: THREAT TO THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF CHINA?

By

MAY 8 1966

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

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The Soviet Union: Threat to the Peoples' Republic of China?

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
SUMMARY	iii
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNISM	6
Chinese Communism	7
Soviet Communism	10
Growth of Communist parties	11
3. POLITICAL	14
Foreign policy	16
Communist policy toward developing nations	19
The Sino-Soviet dispute	21
Effects of the dispute	24
4. GEOGRAPHIC CONSIDERATIONS	34
5. SOCIOLOGICAL FACTORS	39
Communist China	39
Soviet Union	40
Border areas	44
6. ECONOMY	46
Communist China	46
Soviet Union	55
7. MILITARY	64
Communist China's armed forces	64
Communist Chinese military strategy	70
Soviet armed forces	72
Soviet military strategy	76
8. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY	78
Communist Chinese developments	78
Soviet developments	82
9. TERRITORIAL FACTORS	85
Frontier delimitations	85
Siberia and the Soviet Far East	89
United Nations proposal	90
10. BORDER STATES	92
Mongolia	92
Other disputed areas	96
11. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS	99
BIBLIOGRAPHY	109
ANNEX A. Map of Communist China	120
ANNEX B. Map of USSR	121
ANNEX C. Table of Sino-Soviet Trade 1950-1963	122
ANNEX D. Map of China's Lost Territory	123
ANNEX E. Map of Chinese Territories Taken by Imperialism	124
ANNEX F. Map of China-USSR Border—Eastern Sector	126
ANNEX G. Map of China-USSR Border—Western Sector	127

SUMMARY

For ten years Communist China and the Soviet Union have been engaged in an ideological dispute. It began with basic differences over the inevitability of war and the need for violent revolution to achieve world Communism. It progressed to policy disagreements toward "western imperialists" and "bourgeois nationalists" in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. It has now degenerated into an old-fashioned power struggle over territory. The dispute has had, and continues to have, an adverse effect on the relationship between these two Communist states and is affecting the unity of the Communist camp. It is the purpose of this thesis to analyze the political, geographical, sociological, economic, military, and scientific power factors of both China and the USSR to determine whether the Chinese leaders consider the USSR to be a threat to the Peoples' Republic of China.

Both countries are competing for political and economic influence in the peripheral states of Asia and in the developing nations of the world. China is acting to reduce and eliminate Soviet influence on the rimland of South and Southeast Asia and to prevent a USSR-US detente. The policy objectives of the USSR and China collide in one major area; both are trying to dominate and control Communist parties within the Communist camp and in the developing nations. The dispute may well reach the point where Communist China may go its own independent way on its road to Communism, as did Yugoslavia and Albania.

China's economy today is on the level of that of the USSR in the 1930's. Her unfortunate experience with Soviet economic and technical aid has forced her to stop placing sole reliance for China's national growth on the USSR or any other single nation. While the limited production of industry and agriculture is slowly rising, Chinese leaders admit that it will take 30 to 50 years to build their industry, agriculture, and national defense to a level which will establish China as a self-reliant major world power capable of competing on an equal basis with other powers.

China's military strength lies in her large, defense-oriented conventional force, which is no match for the sophisticated, offense-oriented Soviet force. Under Mao's concept of "Peoples' War," great stress is placed on the Peoples' Armed Police Force and the large civilian militia. Having successfully tested two atomic devices, China is giving priority to the modernization of her armed forces and to the development of a credible nuclear capability. With continued Soviet emphasis on advancement in science and technology and increases in military and nuclear power, China has little chance of overtaking the USSR. However, the use of a developed

atomic capability by China for nuclear blackmail to achieve political goals on her periphery in the next few years is not discounted.

The issue of debated territory along the Sino-Soviet borders appears to be a "red herring" in China's challenge of the USSR. China can be expected to continue border pressures against the USSR through propaganda and incidents in order to gain political advantage and eventually to delimit the now unmarked Sino-Soviet borders on terms more favorable to China. Armed conflict over such issues is not probable.

The thesis concludes that the Chinese leadership does not regard the USSR as a serious threat to Chinese Communist national security. Although a nuclear-armed China will, within the next decade, change the attitudes and relationships of both nations, a military confrontation between these two states is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Under present leadership, the ideological dispute will continue. As a consequence, Sino-Soviet relations are likely to deteriorate because of racial, economic, sociological, territorial, and national differences. The gradual emergence of the Peoples' Republic of China as a major world power will have an increasing impact in Asia and throughout the world.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Foreign Minister of the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC), Chen Yi, during his press conference on 29 September 1965, made the following reference to the Soviet Union and its "Krushchev revisionists": "Krushchev wanted to dictate China's policy . . . China's policy must be decided by China itself and not by the Krushchev revisionists."¹

There is more than an inference in the statement of Soviet interference in the internal affairs of the PRC or Communist China. If such is the case, how, then, do the leaders of Communist China regard the USSR? Do they consider the USSR a threat to Chinese Communist national security?

A look at recent developments affecting and involving both nations will provide partial answers to these questions.

Since the summer of 1963, Communist China has made a major effort to eliminate Soviet influence in the greater part of Asia.² It began when China first opposed the signing of the partial nuclear test ban treaty by the USSR and the US, at which time she demanded that Asian Communist parties choose between the militant revolutionary philosophy of Mao Tse-tung or the peaceful co-existence

¹Chen Yi, Press Conference, 29 Sep. 1965.

²Seymour Topping, "Moscow and Peking: We're Asians, Too," New York Times, 16 Jan. 1966, p. E-3.

thesis of Krushchev. The major parties in East Asia (North Korea, North Vietnam, and Indonesia), previously neutral in the ideological dispute, were forced to bend to Chinese will. Her next move came in the abortive summit conference of African and Asian leaders at Algiers. She is striving to exclude the Soviet Union from all Afro-Asian solidarity organizations.

Communist China sees in the Soviet challenge in Asia the frustration of the principal objectives of her foreign policy. The Soviets, on the other hand, are seeking to rally the support of Asian Communist parties for the Soviets' effort to reassert their leadership of the international Communist movement. The USSR, uneasy about unresolved Chinese claims to parts of Siberia and Sinkiang, does not intend to allow China to organize Asia against her.

More recently, the basic aim of Soviet foreign policy appeared less to foster the spread of Communism throughout the world and more to establish the USSR as a reasonable power worthy of respect and, hopefully, perhaps, of imitation by emerging nations who do not wish to espouse Communism as such. China takes the opposite view of advocating upheaval and world revolution through wars of national liberation. While the Soviets still admire limited wars between national movements and old colonialist regimes, they regard wars between states, particularly those already liberated from colonialism, as too explosive and wasteful to encourage.³

³Peter Grose, "Peacemaker Role Intrigues Kremlin," New York Times, 16 Jan. 1966, p. E-3.

The year 1965 was a particularly bad one for the Chinese. Internally, China's economy failed to meet anticipated goals. Externally, she suffered such political disasters as the abortive Communist (PKI) coup in Indonesia; removal from Africa of Chinese diplomats in Burundi, Central African Republic, and Dahomey and in Algeria, of Ben Bella, an ardent supporter of the Chinese; the establishment in January, 1966, by the Soviets in Castro Cuba's Havana of a "general headquarters" to foment revolts and to coordinate the wars of liberation (Tri-Continental Conference of Solidarity of Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America); and in February 1966, the coup in Ghana which deposed President Kwame Nkrumah.

With the beginning of 1966, the leaders of the Soviet Union appear to have launched an offensive to contain or isolate Communist China and to restore Soviet leadership in the Communist world. In Asia itself, Soviet leaders have been particularly active. The mutual assistance pact with the Peoples' Republic of Mongolia, the only Asian country to side clearly with the Soviets against the Chinese, was extended 20 more years (signed in Ulan Bator on 15 January 1966). The Indian-Pakistani agreement signed in Tashkent, USSR, on 10 January 1966 was a signal Soviet success in the diplomatic field.⁴ The Soviets' involvement in North Vietnam, while ostensibly aiding that country militarily and economically, is unquestionably designed to enhance the Soviets'

⁴Ibid.

own power and prestige in Asia. At the 23rd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in Moscow on 29 March 1966, the presence of observers from some 70 foreign Communist parties, including a prestigious delegation from North Vietnam, was a heady tactical triumph for the Russians.⁵ Soviet-Japanese relationships are friendlier now than at any other time since the end of the second World War.

As a direct result of the Sino-Soviet dispute, Soviet power is being applied to re-establish unity, cohesion, and authority in the Communist world under Soviet leadership. The door is left open for Communist China to enter the international Communist camp. The point to remember is that the goal of world revolution is the same for the leaders of both countries; the only argument is about means, not ends. The dispute may continue for years or it may end in early compromise. Political power and prestige are at stake domestically and internationally. Leadership, time, and world events will probably shape the destinies of the Soviet Union and Communist China and their respective positions and status in Asia.

Communist China's national strategy vis-a-vis the USSR is directly affected by her evaluation of the political, economic, sociological, military, and scientific power factors. The material that follows examines and assesses these power factors which have an impact on the relative positions of the USSR and the PRC in Asia and evaluates the national power of each. The relationship

⁵"Soviets Say War Blocks Better Ties," Washington Post, 30 Mar. 1966, p. 1.

between the Chinese dragon and the Russian bear will affect not only Asia but the rest of the world as well.

CHAPTER 2

DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNISM

The histories of Russia and China go back many centuries and are well documented in contemporary volumes and treatises on this subject. The scope here is limited to those factors which influenced the arrival and growth of Communism as we know it today in each of these countries and to see the interrelationship of the historical episodes in the development of each of these two Communist nations.

China, as one of the oldest civilized countries, has a recorded history of almost four thousand years—a history replete with examples of dynastic decay, foreign invasion, war, and revolution. History reveals that China's association with Russia can be traced to the thirteenth century when Ghenghis Khan established a dominion which reached from the Pacific and engulfed both China and Russia.¹

The Chinese and Russians have much in common even though the peoples of each state developed from two distinct embryos at either extremity of the great continent of Asia. The Chinese grew into a nation centuries before the Russians. The centers of both nations were established in the midst of vast inland plains. Their frontiers expanded with their populations and the effectiveness of their military powers.

¹James Vivian Davidson-Houston, Russia and China, p. 18.

Both countries produced enormous peasant populations which, because of repeated famines and poor communications systems, were often half-starved with death and suffering accepted as a way of life. A characteristic of both nations was the deportation of ethnic groups, tribes, criminals, and entire segments of society without regard for humanitarian considerations.² Violent and bloody changes of regimes were common to both. Until modern times, illiteracy was a common feature. Races and cultures have blended and merged into the single social system which exists today. The common backgrounds of the two peoples are more or less compatible even though their individual characters or psychologies may be different and even antagonistic.

The early period of the twentieth century also revealed basic similarities in the domestic conditions in China and Russia; military defeats and a growing lack of confidence in the governments and the existing political systems set the stage for Communist ideologies and beliefs.³

CHINESE COMMUNISM

The May Fourth Movement in 1919 initiated a new, nationwide anti-imperialist campaign in China as a consequence of a provision of the Versailles Peace Treaty that awarded German rights in Shantung to Japan. Mao Tse-tung considered the start of this

²Ibid., p. 23.

³Ibid., p. 92.

movement as the turning point in the Chinese revolution. The fact remains, however, that Communist influence was not apparent in the May Fourth Movement. Mao and his colleagues turned to Communism during this movement primarily as nationalists who wanted to restore the ancient greatness of the Middle Kingdom, which had considered itself the center of the world. Nevertheless, it was at this point in time that the political leaders of the revolution started to come from the proletariat rather than from the bourgeoisie class, as had been the case heretofore. It was from this time, too, that the USSR and China began to take increasing note of each other.⁴

By the spring of 1921, Mao Tse-tung, after reading the Communist Manifesto (translated into Chinese), considered himself a Marxist. The Chinese Communist Party (CPC) was founded on 1 July 1921 in Shanghai, originally under the influence of the Soviet Communist Party. The First Party Congress was held in Shanghai and 12 delegates, including Mao and 50 party members, participated.⁵ The Second Congress of the Communist Party convened in Shanghai in 1922 with three hundred members present. It was at this Congress that the Party officially joined the Comintern as one of its branches. The Third Congress was held in Canton in June 1923. As a result of this Congress, in 1924 Communists sought membership in the Kuomintang—as individuals. Communist Party membership

⁴Anne Fremantle, ed., Mao Tse-tung: An Anthology of His Writings, p. xxvii.

⁵Ibid., p. xxxi.

rose to 57,900 by 1927. From the very beginning, the Communists succeeded in winning over the leading elements of the working classes in many cities. In the late 1920's, however, divisions within the party and military pressures by the Kuomintang forced the Chinese Communist Party to fight for its life for ten lean years, and it barely survived.

By 1930, Mao had begun the organization of the Red Army. The attempted destruction of this force by Chiang Kai-shek's offensive in October 1933 brought about the "Long March." This event, which began on 16 October 1934, lasted one year and covered some eight thousand miles. It began with 100,000 men and ended with barely 20,000. Mao Tse-tung rose to leadership in the CPC without Stalin's support and, perhaps, even contrary to Stalin's wishes, assuming control at the Tsunji Conference at Kweichow in January 1935. A dispute on party strategy in 1938 between Mao Tse-tung and Chang Kuo-t'ao established Mao as the unchallenged leader.⁶ By 1945 the Communists, under Mao's leadership, controlled some 90 million people, and the Chinese Communist Party numbered 1.2 million members.⁷

A series of military engagements between Communist and Kuomintang forces, beginning July 1946, destroyed the Kuomintang regime. On 1 October 1949 Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the establishment of the Peoples' Republic of China and was elected its first chairman.

⁶Union Research Institute, Communism in China, p. 27.

⁷Fremantle, op. cit. p. xliii.

This event ended a disastrous period of Chinese history. It brought hope of a united, peaceful country which, since 1840 partially and 1911 totally, had been the victim of civil war, invasion, and revolution—a country which, in 1949, was 90 per cent illiterate and 95 per cent hungry.⁸

The revolution in China by the Communists can be said to have started as an urban movement in the 1920's. It continued in the form of an intermittent civil war with the incumbent government until victory was achieved in 1949. So began the Peoples' Republic of China.

SOVIET COMMUNISM

In Russia, on the other hand, a comparatively non-violent revolution was carried out by a coup d'etat which subsequently expanded into a civil war that involved both domestic and foreign enemies. The war lasted more than three years.

An abortive revolution in 1905 had signaled growing dissatisfaction among the people. World War I accentuated the existing internal tension. The bread riots in Petrograd in February 1917 were followed by further disorders and demands for sweeping political changes. This unrest culminated in the formation of a new regime that was rooted in the middle class. The new provisional government was not truly revolutionary, since those who had de facto influence before, now officially assumed power.⁹

⁸Fremantle, op. cit., p. xliv.

⁹Walther Kirchner, History of Russia, pp. 208-209.

The first Bolshevik bid for power was made in June 1917 through a series of organized riots, strikes, and uprisings by the workers. The violence was quelled by the Kerensky government forces. As a consequence, Lenin had to go into hiding and Trotsky was arrested.¹⁰

The Bolsheviks continued to undermine the authority of the Kerensky government and, late in September 1917, secured for the first time a majority in the constituent assembly. Trotsky became the president of the Petrograd Soviet. The Bolshevik leaders increased their propaganda for direct action, formed their own "Red Guards," and furthered the disorganization of the regular armed forces.¹¹

In October 1917 Lenin returned to Petrograd, secured control of the garrison and army elements, and proceeded to prepare an armed uprising. On the day of the convening of the All-Russian Congress of the Soviets in Petrograd on 25 October 1917 (7 November on the Soviet calendar), the Bolsheviks executed a long-planned coup d'etat and overthrew the Kerensky government. Lenin proclaimed the "victory of socialism" and, shortly thereafter, Bolshevik rule was extended to Moscow where the Kremlin was taken.¹²

Civil war between the Bolsheviks (Reds) and the counter-revolutionaries (Whites—former officials, nobles, military men)

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid., p. 212.

¹²Ibid., p. 213.

began immediately after assumption of power by the Soviets. Allied intervention, consisting of British, US, and Japanese forces, followed five months later. The civil war continued until October 1920, when foreign forces were all withdrawn. This period also saw the Russians involved in an external war against the Poles. The Polish campaign terminated with the Treaty of Riga in May 1921, which resulted in a Russian loss of territory that had been coveted by the Poles. A disastrous famine at the end of 1920 added to the chaos. Yet, despite the internal and external wars, despite the famine and disintegration of society, the Bolshevik government survived and, in the year 1921, Soviet Russia began its development as a Communist state.¹³

During the revolution and civil war, the Bolsheviks were able to win over a large segment, probably even a majority, of the Russian working class, at least in the industrial centers. The Bolsheviks themselves called their revolution proletarian. There is no question but that the revolution would not have been possible without the support of the peasant masses, many of them in the army. The fact remains, however, that the Bolsheviks were unmistakably the leaders.

GROWTH OF COMMUNIST PARTIES

The establishment of the Peoples' Republic of China in 1949 was the termination of a struggle for power inside China which

¹³Ibid., p. 221.

lasted nearly thirty years. The background of this revolution was quite different from the Russian revolution of 1917. The Chinese Communists were a formidable force within the state and they represented a genuinely popular movement. The Bolsheviks were a motley band that represented a minority group of revolutionists. The Russian revolution was made by about 200,000 party members, mostly intellectuals and workers with their roots in the cities. Lenin's promises of land, timed to the revolutionary upheaval in Petrograd (Leningrad) and Moscow, secured the cooperation of the peasants. But they were never made to feel a part of the movement.

The Chinese revolution, on the other hand, was always deeply rooted in the villages. The five million party members organized the countryside as a prelude to the advance of the Red Army. Under the direction of this rural-oriented Communist leadership, many of China's one million villages had already known two decades of evolving discipline.¹⁴

So, from these early beginnings, Communism and the Party have grown. Party membership in the USSR in 1965 totalled 12 million,¹⁵ plus a membership of more than 22 million in the Young Communist League.¹⁶ In Communist China, Party membership is estimated at

¹⁴ Chester Bowles, "A Long Look at China," reprint from Saturday Evening Post, 4 April 1959, pp. 1-4.

¹⁵ "Communists' Duty to Challenge Faulty Decisions," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XVII, No. 28, 4 Aug. 1965, pp. 10-11.

¹⁶ "Directing YCL Toward Youth's Needs," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XVII, No. 25, 14 Jul. 1965, pp. 3-7.

18 million.¹⁷ The Communist Party has also grown in other parts of Asia that are contiguous to these countries. In North Korea, for instance, the Korean Workers' Party (pro-Chinese) approximates 1.3 million members; in North Vietnam, 600,000 to 700,000 members in the Vietnam Workers' Party (pro-Chinese). Japan's two Communist parties total 105,000 (pro-Chinese) and 3,000 (pro-Soviet). The Mongolian Peoples' Revolutionary Party membership (pro-Soviet) numbers about 46,000.¹⁸

Communist Party control in both states is virtually absolute. The question as to which party is the one truly Marxist-Leninist party is one of the bases for the Sino-Soviet dispute today. The outcome will affect, in varying degrees, the other Communist parties that now exist in 88 countries and have a total membership of 46.7 million.¹⁹ Together the USSR and China control over 91% of the total party-state territory. This territory contains 86% of the party-state population and produces over three-fourths of the total GNP of the combined Communist camp.²⁰ The stakes are high and the consequences serious for the loser of this battle for international power.

¹⁷Leopold Labedz, International Communism After Krushchev, pp. 217-233.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹"Pravda Challenges Chinese Stand on Communist Unity," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XVII, No. 24, 7 Jul. 1965, pp. 3-7.

²⁰Jan F. Triska, "Stanford Studies of the Communist System: The Sino-Soviet Split," Background, Vol. 8, No. 3, Nov. 1964, pp. 143-159.

CHAPTER 3

POLITICAL

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Peoples' Republic of China are dictatorships in which ultimate power is exercised by the leaders of the Communist Party. The Soviet Union is a federation of 15 theoretically autonomous republics. The executive branch of the Soviet government is the USSR Council of Ministers. The National Party Congress is the highest body of party authority. It is responsible for electing a Central Committee which, in turn, elects the Presidium of the Communist Party Central Committee. The Presidium has 12 voting members and is the supreme policy-making body in the USSR. The Central Committee Secretariat is the second most important decision-making body in the Soviet government, ranking next to the Presidium. The Supreme Soviet, which functions as a legislature and is composed of popularly elected deputies, completes the governmental structure. While ostensibly a constitutional democracy, party control prevents any exercise of autonomy by governmental bodies. The supreme authority in both party and government is vested in the members of the Presidium. Leonid I. Brezhnev is the First Secretary and the ranking Party official, and Aleksei N. Kosygin is the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and the ranking government official. Together with their Presidium associates, they control both the Party and the government. This new Soviet leadership is bureaucratic in style

and impersonal in form. It emphasizes Kollektivnost Rukovodstvo, collectivity of leadership rather than the traditional collective leadership.¹

The government of the Peoples' Republic of China does not differ radically from that of the USSR. Here, too, the Party is all powerful, in controlling the 21 provinces and five autonomous regions of Communist China. Unlike the USSR, ultimate power in the Chinese Communist system rests in one man, Mao Tse-tung. The government includes the National Party Congress, the leading body of the Party; the Central Committee; the Central Political Bureau (Politburo) with its standing committee (Premier Chou En-lai is a member of each); the Secretariat; and the National Peoples Congress. The formal head of state is the Chairman of the Republic, a seat reserved for the highest ranking members of the Party. Mao Tse-tung and President Liu Shao-chi occupy this office. The National Defense Council, under Teng Hsiao-ping, and the Supreme State Conference, under Chou En-lai, are directly responsible to the Chairman of the Republic.² Thus, in both states, both Communist, the party and the government apparatus are closely intertwined but the party formulates national policy and strategy.

¹U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, National Policy Machinery in the Soviet Union, 1960, pp. 5-7.

²U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Staffing Procedures and Problems in Communist China, 1963, pp. 2-14.

FOREIGN POLICY

The Communist view of the world in the era of Stalin and particularly after World War II, was based on a two-camp doctrine of Communist and non-Communist. A great shift in Communist policy was noted in the period of 1955-1956. The Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Party in Moscow decreed a completely new approach toward the new nations. The new view of the world then included a third camp—nationalist. The Soviet objectives in regard to the new states were twofold—first, to protect the security of the Communist international system and, second, to establish Communist power.

This new concept was reflected in the announced foreign policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1965; to create the most favorable conditions for the building of Communism in their country; establish close solidarity and cooperation between all countries of the socialist commonwealth; provide full support to liberation movements of people; and strengthen peace and peaceful co-existence between states with different social systems.³ From this statement one can conclude that the domestic policy of maintaining the national security of the USSR is of first-priority. It is followed in turn by a foreign policy aimed at integrating Communist states, supporting wars of national liberation, and establishing close relations

³"Pravda Resumes Polemics with Chinese over Unity," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XVII, No. 47, 19 Nov. 1965, pp. 3-5.

with nationalist and developing states in that order.⁴ Soviet policy toward China appears designed to isolate her on the Asian continent and to relegate her to a subordinate role in the world Communist movement.

The foreign policy of Communist China was born in the loess caves of Yen-an during the period of 1935-1945. It began with the assumption that China was destined to be the Middle Kingdom of Asia; that Communism would bring this about; and that, if China went Communist, much of the rest of Asia would be dragged along with it.⁵ China's announced policy in 1949 provided:

The principle of the foreign policy of the Peoples' Republic of China is the protection of the independence, freedom, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of the country, upholding lasting international peace and friendly cooperation between peoples of all countries, and opposition to the imperialist policies of aggressor and war.⁶

With time, China's interests expanded. She intervened in Europe, supporting Krushchev in the action taken against Hungary and in the stiffer line against Yugoslavia. She became increasingly active in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and in Latin America. In Asia, Chinese leaders began to consider their country as one of the world's major powers and became determined that China would play the role of a great power.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Guy Wint, "China and Asia," China, the Emerging Red Giant, pp. 28-40.

⁶Tsui Yang, "Brilliant Achievement of China's Policy of Peaceful Coexistence," China, the Emerging Red Giant, pp. 243-251.

While both China and the USSR have the same basic domestic policies to maintain the security and integrity of their states, their foreign policies have of late been more and more divergent. China's domestic and external goals are so closely related that it is difficult to differentiate between her foreign and domestic policies. There is no doubt of China's policy objective toward the USSR. She still intends to replace the USSR as the leader of the world Communist movement, and to eliminate Soviet presence and influence in Asia, particularly in the Far East. China's long-range policy is to regain certain territory now in Soviet hands which was obtained from China through "unequal treaties."

Policy divergences have also arisen within the Chinese Communist Party. These differences have produced rival factions. One faction, headed by Premier Chou En-lai and including Foreign Minister Chen Yi, favors a more flexible approach to foreign and domestic policy. An opposing faction, which includes Party Secretary Teng Hsiao-ping and Vice-Premier Peng Chen, is more dogmatic in its outlook. Such divisive tensions within top-level Communist Chinese circles will have an impact on future Chinese foreign policy.⁷

Communist China's foreign policy goals have already suffered serious setbacks in her recent militant drive in the world arena. Her attempt to seize the leadership of the world Communist movement has not succeeded. Her effort to exclude United States power

⁷Stanley Karnow, "Tensions Within Peking Seen," Washington Post, 9 Mar. 1966, p. 1.

from Asia has failed. Communist China has not been recognized as the paramount nation in the African-Asian world. Her influence is ebbing and she has been forced to take a defensive attitude. The pendulum in foreign relations has, for the present, swung in the favor of the USSR.⁸

COMMUNIST POLICY TOWARD DEVELOPING NATIONS

In their own way, both the Chinese and Soviets feel that the present situation in the developing nations is favorable to the expansion of Communism. The Chinese take the position that local Communists must take all steps possible to promote seizure of power in their countries by armed force and, although the force initially must come from within the country in question, the Chinese are prepared to lend concrete and substantial assistance to these "national liberation movements." The Soviets take a much more conservative view of moving the various states progressively toward membership in the Communist system. The Soviet position results, to a large extent, from her defeat in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. This incident brought about a gradual change in Soviet foreign policy. The Soviets became more cautious in their outlook for promoting Communist revolutions in the world. The risks and costs involved in a policy of world-wide intervention were no doubt carefully weighed in arriving at a decision to

⁸Seymour Topping, "Mao's Infallibility," New York Times, 17 Feb. 1966, p. 11.

confine themselves to indirect intervention of supplying arms and providing moral support.

The Communist Chinese, however, do not agree with the Soviet position. They still believe in world revolution and its promotion by armed struggle. They continue to promote national wars of liberation in the developing areas of the world without restraint, undoubtedly considering the risk of escalation negligible. This policy was reinforced by Marshal Lin Biao, Defense Minister of the Peoples' Republic of China, on 3 September 1965, in his statement for establishing revolutionary base areas: "Taking the entire globe, if North American and Western Europe can be called 'the cities of the world,' then Asia, Africa, and Latin America constitute the 'rural areas of the world.'" This is Mao Tse-tung's theory of "Peoples' War" as fought in the Chinese revolution in which cities were encircled from rural areas and then subsequently captured.

Thus the Chinese Communists, by their own declarations, are more revolutionary than the Soviets. Their party is strongly nationalistic and ambitious; they have one of the largest conventional armed forces in the world; and they are placing the highest priority on developing a nuclear capability. Their success or failure will be equated directly to the policy they pursue in attaining their stated objectives.⁹

⁹Ralph L. Powell, "China's Bomb: Exploitation and Reactions," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 4, Jul. 1965, pp. 616-625.

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

The combination of disagreements over policy toward the "imperialists" and toward the "bourgeois nationalists" in the third world of Asia, Africa, and Latin America is at the root of the Sino-Soviet dispute today.

Chinese motives are an inextricable mixture of Chinese national and Communist revolutionary aims. Mao's views in the ideological dispute with Soviet leaders generally coincide with Lenin's. Chinese Communist leaders want to win other Communist parties over to their "correct" Marxist-Leninist line. The Chinese have already begun to encourage their sympathizers within hostile Communist parties to break away and form "true" Marxist-Leninist Communist parties. Accordingly, splinter parties have developed in more than 40 nations around the world, including such Asian countries as India, Ceylon, Burma, and Nepal. China has the backing of about 20 Communist Party splinter groups. In the case of India and Ceylon, the Chinese factions are large enough to pose a serious threat to the dominant pro-Soviet groups.¹⁰

Some slippage was noted in early 1966 in the Chinese hold over the formerly pro-Chinese Japanese and North Korean Communist Parties. This diminution of influence so close to home is subtler than the political rebuffs China has received in Indonesia, Ghana,

¹⁰ Roderick MacFarquhar, "China Goes It Alone, Atlantic, Apr. 1965, p. 73.

Cuba, and elsewhere in the Afro-Asian world. The trend for positions of independent and autonomous parties may well be a sign of the times for the international Communist movement.¹¹

The turning point in the history of world Communism came at a secret session of the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in Moscow on 24 February 1956. This session signaled the ferment and upheaval of 1956 in Poland and Hungary, precipitated the rightist deviations of European Communists, and is the true starting point of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

It was at the Twentieth Congress that Premier Krushchev announced two radical changes in the Leninist canon. One related to the inevitability of war and the other to the necessity for violent revolution in achieving world Communism. It was here that Premier Krushchev attacked Stalin. The demotion of Stalin proved to be embarrassing to the Chinese since they had built up in China the image of the "Communist Party of Lenin and Stalin," and were now told that it was a mistake. It was here, too, that the Chinese accused Krushchev of betraying Marxism-Leninism and the revolution.

The Moscow Conference of November 1957 ended in a declaration of militant Communist intentions and the need for strict discipline within the Communist world in fighting against

¹¹ Richard Halloran, "Chinese Find Some Obstacles in Foreign Parties," Washington Post, 20 Mar. 1966, p. H-11.

"dogmatism" and "revisionism." Emphasis was laid on the dynamics of national liberation movements. The Chinese not only signed this declaration but also co-sponsored it with the Soviets.

Since the Sino-Soviet dispute broke into the open in April 1960, it has increased in scope and intensity. While a complete review of the Sino-Soviet dispute is not intended in this paper, certain key documents and events should be noted. The "Twenty-Five Theses of Mao Tse-tung," announced on 14 June 1963, were rebutted by the Soviets on 14 July in an "Open Letter of the CPSU." This letter is a basic statement of Soviet position. This letter was subsequently followed by six governmental declarations and an exchange of correspondence that involved seven more letters. Then came nine commentaries by the Chinese on the Soviet "Open Letter" and on Suslov's speech of 14 February 1964, with various subsequent commentaries in Pravda. Such exchanges continue even to the present.

Within the past year, Chinese Communists have suffered serious setbacks abroad. Since February 1965, their diplomats have been expelled from three African states--Burundi, Dahomey, and the Central African Republic. In Algeria the Chinese lost Ben Bella, one of their staunchest supporters. They are disputing with Castro in Cuba. Their influence in North Korea and North Vietnam has been significantly superseded by Soviet prestige. The pro-Chinese Indonesian Communist Party, the largest in a non-Communist state, has been shattered in the

aftermath of the September 1965 abortive coup d'etat.¹² The coup in Ghana in February 1966, which deposed President Kwame Nkrumah, visibly embarrassed the Chinese who had publicized him as one of Africa's heroes.¹³ The Chinese, at one point, accused the Soviets of suppressing revolutionary movements and of plotting with the United States instead of destroying the "citadel of imperialism." They called on the "colored peoples" of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to rally behind China against the USSR and the US. The vehemence of such attacks increases with time.

Because of the friction within the Chinese ruling hierarchy, Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi, while favoring a flexible approach in international relations, have been forced to adopt tough positions. The results have been disastrous.

EFFECTS OF THE DISPUTE

Principal Chinese reaction to the Sino-Soviet dispute has been a shift from primary emphasis on ideological issues to stress on national differences that affect security. On 2 February 1966, the Communist Party newspaper, Jenmin Jih Pao, said:

The course taken by the Soviet leaders on the Vietnam, India-Pakistan, and Japan questions completely conforms with requirements of United States imperialism, especially with the latter's policy of encircling China.

In another article published on 5 February 1966, China accused

¹²Stanley Karnow, "Unhappy New Year for China's Mao," Washington Post, 23 Jan. 1966, p. E-1.

¹³Stanley Karnow, "Peking Admits Policy Reverses, Hints Leaders May Have Erred," Washington Post, 8 Mar. 1966, p. 1.

Japan of "aligning itself with the Soviet Union to oppose China." Soviet-Japanese relations may have been a particularly sensitive point with the Chinese, since China has been supporting Japanese demands that the USSR resolve the Japanese territorial issues that emerged from World War II. There is speculation that these pronouncements may either disclose a sense of growing isolation and fear of attack, or they may represent a deliberate attempt to dwell on the danger of foreign encirclement as a measure to enforce internal discipline, particularly of Army officers who are restive under the stringent political controls of the party.¹⁴

Earlier, the Soviets had taken an action which may have repercussions within the entire Communist movement. On 30 January 1966 Pravda hinted that Soviet leaders were dropping the term, "period of the cult of personality," a derogatory phrase used since 1956 to describe the period of the great purges during Josef Stalin's 29-year rule.¹⁵ The term had been coined by former Premier Nikita Krushchev in his indictment of Stalin, delivered at the Twentieth Communist Party Congress in 1956.

The slowdown or halt in the de-Stalinization campaign, while allegedly intended by Soviet leaders to put Soviet history in the proper perspective, may have valuable political side effects in

¹⁴Seymour Topping, "New Phase of China-Soviet Rift Centers on US Encirclement," New York Times, 6 Feb. 1966, p. 1.

¹⁵Sidney Weiland, "Soviet Historians Prepare Ground for Reinstating Stalin in Hero Role," Washington Post, 31 Jan. 1966, p. A-4.

the relationships with Communist China and the other Communist nations. The manner in which such a campaign is handled will determine the degree of success which the Soviets can hope to achieve in re-establishing their position as the fountainhead of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy and will have a direct influence on future Communist China policies and strategy.

How have these events affected other areas of mutual interest?

The Sino-Soviet military pact, signed in February 1950 in Moscow, was aimed at preventing a rebirth of Japanese militarism. Further, it stipulated that both sides would refrain from entering into a coalition that threatens the other, consult each other on questions related to the terms of the treaty, and respect each other's territorial integrity.

Both parties have already flagrantly violated the terms of the treaty, as evidenced by the aid that the USSR furnished India during the 1962 Indo-Chinese border conflict; statements such as Mao Tse-tung made on 10 July 1964; and the attempts by the Chinese in the form of border violations to revise the Sino-Soviet border.

From a Chinese viewpoint, the military alliance was designed to permit her to realize her political and frequently openly aggressive aims in Asia with the help of the Soviet military might. In the Cuban crisis in 1961, China supported the Soviets. When China moved against India, she found herself completely isolated. The fact remains that the USSR wants to insure against the

possibility of an accidental atomic war and is apprehensive that Chinese policy will involve the Soviet Union in an atomic confrontation with the US which she neither desires nor for which she is prepared. The USSR is particularly concerned over China's national imperial goal to capture Taiwan. In this eventuality, the USSR would be faced with a difficult choice.¹⁶

There is evidence that the USSR would probably come to Communist China's aid if that regime was in imminent danger of collapse. While neither government has formally revoked the alliance and both still acknowledge it on each anniversary date, to all intents and purposes, the Sino-Soviet military alliance, as signed on 14 February 1950, does not exist. The Communist Chinese today, by their own expressions and actions, are travelling their own road, governed wholly by their own interests, and acting at their own risk.¹⁷

The Chinese Communists appear to have suffered a serious setback in their rivalry with the USSR for influence in Vietnam. While Soviet military and economic aid to North Vietnam has been significant, Chinese aid has been relatively small. In January 1966 Alexander N. Shelepin headed a Soviet delegation to Vietnam which agreed to increase future Soviet military aid. The Chinese, in turn, have been criticizing both the Soviet aid to Vietnam and

¹⁶ Aleksander A. Kashin, "Does the Sino-Soviet Military Alliance Still Exist?" Analysis of Current Developments, No. 12, 1965/66, entire issue.

¹⁷ Ibid.

the North Vietnamese for being "duped" by the Soviets. While Chinese influence is strong in North Vietnam, that country finds it difficult profitably to remain neutral within the Sino-Soviet dispute.¹⁸ To make matters worse, China has demanded and is receiving transit fee payments in dollars from the Soviets for shipping military and medical supplies to North Vietnam.¹⁹ Economically, the Chinese cannot hope to compete with the Soviets; yet China cannot afford to forfeit her interests in the affairs of her southern neighbor. So goes the battle for power.

On the question of the United Nations, China, according to Chen Yi, considers the UN to be controlled by the United States. He has labeled it an organization "where two big powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, conduct political transactions." As to China's membership in the UN, Chen Yi outlined conditions which must be met prior to her entry, i. e., a major reorganization and reform to expel "imperialist" nations, cancellation of the UN resolution condemning China as an aggressor in Korea, adoption of a resolution condemning the US, and the expulsion of Nationalist China, and the restoration of the PRC as the legitimate Chinese representative in the United Nations. Since

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Stanley Karnow, "Peking Seen Losing Influence in Hanoi," Washington Post, 4 Jan. 1966, p. A-10.

19 Drew Middleton, "China Exacting Dollars of Russia on Aid to Vietnam," New York Times, 4 Dec. 1965, p. 1.

the conditions were announced, the Soviet Union has avoided becoming directly involved, making only a passing reference to the Chinese position in this matter.²⁰

Both Communist China and the USSR are competing for political influence in Africa and Asia by means of radio broadcasts to these areas. Both countries have increased yearly the number of transmitters operating in the foreign broadcasting system and now have a chain of powerful transmitters operating on medium waves along the periphery of their southern frontiers. They have also increased the number of broadcast hours. As an example, the Soviet programs to Africa began in 1960 with broadcasts in Swahili. Since that time, seven other African languages have been added. Both the Soviets and the Chinese beam broadcasts to Latin America (began in 1961), with the USSR transmitting nearly double the number of hours of Chinese broadcasts. The transistor set as a means of mass communication in these developing nations has revolutionized political infiltration techniques and the Communists are taking full advantage of this age of technology.²¹

Soviet propaganda efforts against China itself have also been expanded. Beginning in December 1965, the Soviet Union doubled its radio broadcasting potential on its central Asian frontiers with China, and it constructed a new radio station at

²⁰Chen Yi, Press Conference, 29 Sep. 1965.

²¹Dana Adams Schmidt, "Soviet and Chinese Broadcasts Lead West in Africa and Asia," New York Times, 26 Nov. 1965, p. 12.

Alma-Ata, the capital of the Soviet Kazakh Republic. Sinkiang appears to be the target of this new propaganda effort. Broadcasts are now made in the five languages that represent the multi-national structure of the society on both sides of the border in this region—Kazakh, Russian, Uigur, Korean, and German. The Chinese language is expected to be added and directed at the Dungans, a Moslem people living in western China since the time of Ghenghis Khan. The international political implication of such broadcasts is obvious.²²

The leaders of Communist China believe that the Soviets have joined with the United States to build a "containment wall" encircling China. They see India as a flank in this encirclement movement and the recent Soviet-Japanese amity as a link in the Soviet strategy in Asia to isolate Communist China. Other Soviet actions related to this strategy of encirclement include visits by Soviet leaders to North Vietnam, Korea, and Mongolia. As part of this strategy of "collusion with the United States," the Chinese believe that the Soviets are following a policy of appeasement in Europe by maintaining the status quo in the west in order to concentrate fully on containing China in the east.²³

As further proof of Soviet conspiracy with the US, the Communist Chinese cite the partial nuclear test ban and USSR-US

²²Farnsworth Fowle, "Soviet Expanding Radio Near China," New York Times, 2 Jan. 1966, p. 21.

²³"Whom is the Soviet Leadership Taking United Action With?" Peking Review, Vol. IX, No. 6, 4 Feb. 1966, pp. 10-13.

common interests in a ban on the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Chinese concluded in a letter to the Soviet leaders in 1965:

Between the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties, there is nothing that unites, only that which divides; between them there is nothing in common, there are only differences.²⁴

The war of words notwithstanding, the Chinese leaders unquestionably recognize their own weaknesses and limitations. This was evidenced during Mao Tse-tung's talk with Japanese socialists on 10 July 1964 when he said:

There are no fatalities in paper warfare. We have been waging a paper war for several years now and no one has died as a result. We are quite prepared to carry on this war for another twenty-five years.

The question for the future is: What follows the paper war?

The issue will probably be brought to a head at the Soviet Communist Party Congress which opens in Moscow on 29 March 1966. In a secret letter to Communist Parties around the world just prior to the start of the Congress, the Soviets accused China of trying to provoke a Soviet-US war. China was also blamed for refusing proposals for bilateral meetings of delegates from Soviet and Chinese Communist Parties. The letter also acknowledged that the USSR, in 1965, delivered about one-half billion rubles (exchange \$1.10) worth of weapons (rocket installations, artillery, tanks, coastal defenses, warships, and others) to North Vietnam and was training pilots, missile personnel, tankers, and artillerymen. It accused the Chinese of interfering with air and

²⁴Pravda, 16 Nov. 1965, p. 5.

rail shipments of war materiel through China to North Vietnam. It attacked Marshal Lin Piao's thesis of September 1965 as leading to anti-Communist successes in destroying Communist parties in the developing areas. Finally, the Soviet Central Committee condemned the entire Chinese policy as "militant, great-power chauvinism, employing empty ultra-revolutionary talk and petty bourgeois revolutionizing." There is little doubt that the Soviets are now solidly on the political offensive against Communist China.²⁵

China's failure to attend this Congress may indicate that a climax has been reached after more than a decade of tension and bitterness. Her leaders recognize the Soviet offensive which has been launched to restore Party unity within the world Communist movement, with or without China. How China reacts to this offensive may well shape the future of the movement and affect the security and stability of the world.²⁶

In summary, the Chinese are demanding the right of co-determination in all questions concerning the Eastern bloc and the world Communist movement, or else they want a clear demarcation of the two hegemonial areas and their appurtenant spheres of interest. The Soviets are not acceding to such demands. The Chinese feel that the Soviets are following a strategy

²⁵Anatole Shub, "Secret Soviet Blast at Peking Revealed," Washington Post, 22 March 1966, p. 1.

²⁶Harry Schwartz, "Moscow-Peking Dispute: A Decade of Bitterness," New York Times, 24 March 1966, p. 17.

of isolating and containing Communist China in Asia. Accordingly, world Communism has been divided into two camps, grouped around two centers of leadership and speaking two different languages. This division has resulted in a weakening of the world Communist movement, but it has not lessened its fundamental aggressiveness. The bitter struggle for a position of superior power has made both nations aware that they belong to two worlds which differ fundamentally in their natural characteristics, including racial and other components, their national traditions, and their habits of thought. On an international scale, the struggle is not unlike the conflict between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks at the Russian Party Congress of 1903. The formation of two separate parties in 1912 resolved that struggle. It culminated in 1921 with only the Bolsheviks surviving and developing the single party state in the USSR. Thus history may have again set the political stage for a similar drama in the world Communist theater which only new actors and time can resolve.²⁷

²⁷Boris Meissner, "World Communism: Decay or Differentiation?" Modern Age, Vol. 9, No. 3, Summer 1965, pp. 231-247.

CHAPTER 4

GEOGRAPHIC CONSIDERATIONS

Communist China, with 3,691,502 square miles of territory including Tibet, ranks as the third largest country in the world (after Canada).¹ Her territory lies entirely in the Asian land mass. As both an Asiatic and Pacific country, China is a land of climatic extremes with desert dryness in the west, sub-arctic cold in the area to the north that is contiguous with the USSR, and sub-tropical warmth in the south. She is surrounded by natural physical barriers, with the Pacific Ocean on the east, the high plateaus on the west, the vast desert to the north, and the Himalayan mountain chain to the south. At least 70 per cent of China is hilly or mountainous, with some peaks reaching 18,000 feet and higher.² Only 15 per cent of her arable land surface can be cultivated. The arable land lies primarily in the marshy and more favorable regions of Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Chinghai, which together comprise one-half of China's usable living space. (Annex A)

The boundary shared with the USSR in the east and north by Manchuria follows the serpentine course of the Amur River. This area is an undulating alluvial plain bounded on the west and

¹Jesse H. Wheeler, Jr., and others, Regional Geography of the World, p. 384.

²Oron P. South, "Communist China," Strategic Briefs, 1961, pp. 160-166.

northwest by the Khingan Mountains and in the east by the highlands through which runs the boundary with Korea. Manchuria is a rail hub between China, the USSR, and Korea, which links key cities in this region. Because of its agricultural potential as the granary of China and its rich natural resources, Manchuria has been and will continue to be regarded as strategically important territory politically, economically, and industrially.³

The areas along China's western borders are remote and difficult. The Peoples' Republic of Mongolia lies as a buffer between the PRC and the USSR and includes the greater part of the Gobi Desert and the northern fringe of grasslands. Sinkiang, the "New Dominion," consists of two well-defined areas, the Tarim Basin to the south and the Dzungarian Basin to the north. These basins are separated by the Tien Shan range of mountains. The Tarim Basin, one of the world's worst deserts, is rimmed to the south by the mountains bordering Tibet. The Dzungarian Basin, largely steppe, is enclosed on the north by the Altai and other ranges along the southern border of the Soviet Union. For centuries, Sinkiang has been the great trade route connecting China and Europe. The Dzungarian Gate continues to be a key road and rail route between China and Soviet Central Asia.⁴

³George Kish, ed., An Introduction to World Geography, pp. 348-350.

⁴Ibid.

China's sea borders extend some 3,300 miles. Her land borders extend for 9,300 miles of which 4,500 miles are contiguous with the USSR and some 2,500 miles border the Mongolian Peoples' Republic.

In terms of area (8.6 million square miles), the Soviet Union is the largest country in the world. It possesses one-sixth of the world's land surface and stretches 7,000 miles from east to west and 3,000 miles from north to south. Although more than two-thirds of the Soviet Union lies in Asia, it cannot be described as either European or Asian, since the bulk of its population is located on the European land mass.⁵
(Annex B)

More than 40 per cent of the Soviet Union (3.5 million square miles) lies within the permafrost zone. Because of its location in the northern segment of the Eurasian continent, the USSR is, to a large extent, landlocked. It embraces all climates, except those of the equatorial and tropical regions, and its weather is characterized by long, cold winters, warm-to-hot summers, and low-to-moderate precipitation. The two striking features of the geographical environment are its territorial immensity and the climate that is associated with its northerly position.

The topography lying between the USSR and China is probably the most rugged of any area of the world. Northeastern Siberia

⁵Wheeler, op. cit., p. 384.

is particularly wild and rugged country with mountain peaks reaching elevations of 10,000 feet or more. The southern Soviet border with China includes some of the highest mountains in the world. The Salyugem Range that forms the international frontier has ranges rising over 9,000 feet. The Shapsal Pass forms a major route between the USSR, Mongolia, and China. The Pamir-Alay Chain is another natural barrier. Its Communism and Lenin Peaks rise to 24,590 feet and 23,363 feet respectively. The Soviet Union has a common land frontier in Asia with China, the Mongolian Peoples' Republic, and North Korea. This frontier's mountainous and arid regions are sparsely populated and form zones of separation, both military and economic, between these countries.

Cross-country military movements along the Sino-Soviet frontiers are difficult in Asia because of the mountainous terrain, arid regions, and poor road networks. There are several approaches between these countries, particularly through the Peoples' Republic of Mongolia. One approach would be through Alma-Ata in a northwesterly direction toward Lake Balkash. Another from Ulan Bator northwest in the general direction of Barnaul-Novosibirsk is feasible. A third from Ulan Bator northward along the shores of Lake Baikal would be possible. In the Far East area, likely approaches include those on the Mukden-Kharbin-Kubyshevka axis and on the Vladivostok-Khabarovsk axis. Except for these routes through dangerous

passes and over rough terrain, access overland in this region of the world would be generally unfeasible from a military standpoint.

CHAPTER 5

SOCIOLOGICAL FACTORS

COMMUNIST CHINA

In terms of population, Communist China ranks first in the world with more than 700 million people. Her growth rate has dropped from 2.66 in 1949 to 2.52 in 1965.¹ The density rate in China is 199 people per square mile. The literacy rate is 55% and the life span, 50 years. The basic religions are Confucian, Buddhist, and Taoist. There are approximately 22,477 persons per automobile; 3,012 per telephone; 134 per radio; and 24,500 per television set.²

Ethnic minorities in China (about six per cent of the total population) are concentrated mainly in the border regions and pose no particular problem. If a line were drawn from the northeastern corner of India to the northern tip of Manchuria, most of the area east of the line would be densely populated and the people predominantly Chinese. West of this line the population is generally sparse; large regions are uninhabited; and many of the people are non-Chinese, primarily Mongols, Tibetans, and Turks. Over 40 per cent of the population at the time of the census in 1953 was seventeen years of age or younger.

¹Ian McCrone, "China Winning in Battle for Lower Birth Rate," Washington Post, 1 Jan. 1966, p. A-5.

²Civic Education Service, Chart, "A World of Facts," 1965.

There is a multiplicity of languages and dialects in China. However, China has launched a language reform program which will adopt Mandarin as a standard national language, popularize the Chinese language among minority groups, simplify the written characters, and alphabetize the Chinese language. This is a part of the national political program associated with the slogan, "One state, one people, one language."

One serious sociological problem facing the Chinese is the overpopulation of the big cities and the farming areas of the North China plain and the Yangtze delta. Population density on the North China plain is 800 to 1,200 per square mile, and in the Yangtze delta it is 2,400 to 3,600 per square mile. As in the USSR, urbanization poses still another problem, as industrialization programs force more and more people into increasing numbers of industrial centers. In attempting to solve these problems, Chinese leaders have instituted programs for developing the frontier areas of the country, curbing migrations from rural to urban areas, and promoting birth control.

SOVIET UNION

The Soviet Union ranks third (after India) with a population of 229.1 million and a growth rate of about 2.0.³ The density rate is 26 people per square mile.⁴ In the Soviet Union the

³"Data on Shift of Population; Concern for Siberia's Lag," The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. VII, No. 35, 22 Sep. 1965, pp. 3-6.

⁴Civic Education Service, op. cit.

literacy rate is 98% and the life span is 70 years. The principal religions are Russian Orthodox and Islamic. There are 258 persons per automobile; 35 per telephone; 6 per radio; and 19 per television set.⁵

The Soviet Union is a multi-national country composed of peoples of over 100 different national groups. It can even be further defined on the basis of language (108 languages according to the 1959 census), culture, history, and physical type. Slavic people represent the dominant population element, both in numbers and in political and economic power. These include Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians, of which the Russians constitute nearly one-half (118 million); Ukrainians, about one-fifth (42 million); and Belorussians, about one-twentieth (8 million) of the total population of the Soviet Union or, combined, about three-fourths of the total population. The other one-fourth is composed of such ethnic groupings as the Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Georgians, Azerbaijanians, Moldavians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Kirghizes, Tadzihs, Armenians, Turkomans, Estonians, and many other lesser groups.⁶ Males comprise only 46 per cent of the population and more than 70 per cent of the population is under the age of 40 years.⁷

Most of the thinly settled and almost uninhabited country is found in Asiatic USSR. About 70 per cent of the population

⁵Ibid.

⁶Jesse H. Wheeler, Jr., and others, Regional Geography of the World, pp. 250-253.

⁷Harry Schwartz, The Soviet Economy Since Stalin, pp. 38-40.

lies west of the Urals in the most heavily populated area. The irregular triangle extending from the Black and Baltic Seas to Novosibirsk and Stalinsk in Siberia is the most important region of the Soviet Union. It contains three-fourths of the total population, all of the principal industrial concentrations, most of the major mining areas, most of the large cities, and the greater part of the total sown acreage of the Soviet Union. The distribution of population conforms with the vegetation pattern. Nearly the whole of the population is located in two regions, the broad-leaved and mixed forest and the grassy steppe belts.

Of primary concern to the Soviet planners is the gradual population shift that is taking place in the country. The most significant shifts are the ones that have been occurring for some time into Siberia and the Far East, as well as to Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Between 1939 and 1959, the population of the USSR as a whole increased by 9.5% according to Soviet statistics, while that of western Siberia increased by 28%; eastern Siberia, 36%; Far East, 62%; Central Asia, 30%; and Kazakhstan, 53%.⁸ The increases resulted from both migrations and increased birth rates which are higher in these areas than elsewhere in the Soviet Union.

Urbanization is yet another trend affecting Soviet development. The shift from the rural to urban areas had its

⁸"Data on Shift of Population; Concern for Siberia's Lag," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. VII, No. 35, 22 Sep. 1965, pp. 3-6.

beginnings in the years 1926-1938 with the accelerated industrial expansion programs which were established. In 1926, 18% of the population was urban; in 1939, 32% was urban. According to the 1959 census, 48% of the total population was urban while in 1965, of the total population of 229.1 million, 121.6 million or 53% were urban and 107.6 million or 47% were classified as rural. In 1964, statistics showed that 56% of those moving to cities were males and 44% were females.

The Soviets' industrialization program is the basic cause of this trend, which can be expected to continue as the Soviet industrial base is expanded. Western Siberia poses the greatest problem to Soviet economic planners. A population shift to the East has been encouraged, but, during the period 1959-1963, about 230,000 fewer people came to western Siberia than departed from this area, mainly to go to eastern Siberia and the Far East. How to keep people in western Siberia, where the climate is harsh, wages are eight per cent lower than elsewhere, living conditions are difficult but arable land is plentiful, is a problem which the Soviets are now attempting to solve.⁹

For economic and strategic reasons the Soviets must continue to seek the resettlement of the thinly populated areas of Asiatic USSR. The discovery of new mineral, oil, and natural gas deposits has spurred migration to the east, particularly to the industrial

⁹Ibid., pp. 16-18.

centers. For example, Kazakhstan expanded from 7,000,000 people in 1953 to 11,700,000 in mid-1964; Novosibirsk grew from 731,000 to 1,013,000; and Sverdlovsk from 707,000 to 897,000 during the period 1956-1964.¹⁰ The ideological conflict with Communist China has focused attention more acutely than ever before on the strategic importance of the areas facing China.

BORDER AREAS

Insofar as the population distribution along the Sino-Soviet border areas is concerned, the 1953 census figures show that approximately 41,301,000 Chinese live in an area of 1,694,000 square miles, an average of 24.3 people per square mile. They can be found along the northeastern, northern, and northwestern border areas of China. In the corresponding areas of the USSR, the census figures of 15 January 1959 indicated that 22,463,000 people inhabited an area of 2,349,000 square miles or 9.6 people per square mile. These figures, in themselves, certainly do not convey an image of overpopulation along Chinese borders as opposed to underpopulation, or a vacuum in Siberia on the opposite side.¹¹ The fact remains, however, that both countries regard their contiguous border areas as critical, both politically and economically.

China's concern with her border territories is also reflected in a recent move to increase the population of a belt of territory

¹⁰Schwartz, op. cit., p. 39.

¹¹Klaus Mehnert, Peking and Moscow, p. 279.

250 miles deep along the China-India border. An estimated two million Chinese colonizers have already moved into the belt that stretches from Ladakh in the Kashmir to the Northeast Frontier Agency area of Assam. To date, about five to eight million Chinese, mostly farmers, have been relocated into Tibet from the overpopulated provinces of China. Although such colonization will assist in alleviating the national population problem, it is not unlikely that the move is designed primarily to strengthen security and control along the border, and to expedite the assimilation of Tibet into Greater China.¹²

¹²P. K. Roy, "Peking Plans Chinese Belt Girdling Tibet," Washington Post, 7 Feb. 1966, p. A-8.

CHAPTER 6

ECONOMY

COMMUNIST CHINA

During the 15 years the Chinese Communist regime has been in power, the over-all record shows significant economic development and marked structural transformation. With their advent to power, the Communists inherited a devastated economy as a consequence of a world war and a prolonged civil war. Agricultural production was curtailed; industrial plants, partially destroyed or dismantled; and transportation and communications, disrupted.

By 1952, basic economic stability was restored. In mid-1955 Mao Tse-tung launched his accelerated and expanded program of industrialization under which, by the end of 1956, virtually all of Chinese agriculture was collectivized and practically all private enterprise eliminated. By 1957, the end of the first Five Year Plan, which began in 1953, an impressive record of industrial development was achieved. The "Great Leap" (1958-1959) strategy, which failed miserably, led to the economic crisis which ensued. The marked decline in agricultural production in 1959 was reflected in shrinking supplies of raw materials for consumer goods industries. By 1960, this decline had forced industries to curtail operations, thus reducing incomes and raising costs of commodities. The situation became so acute in the

winter of 1960-61 that it led to political unrest and the disintegration of local authority in certain areas. The good harvest in 1962 was perhaps the turning point in economic recovery, with its related impact on industrial production. However, some of the momentum which propelled China during the first ten years (1949-1959) has been lost.¹

As a result of this experience, the order of development priorities has been changed to stress agriculture first, consumer goods industries second, and heavy industries third. This is the reverse of the order prevailing in 1960. On a per capita basis, agricultural and industrial production recovered to its 1957 level in 1965. Total agricultural and industrial production may not return to this level, however, until the late 1960's or, possibly, the early 1970's.²

The Soviets in the 1965 annual supplement to the Great Soviet Encyclopedia presented estimates of the actual Chinese production of key commodities in 1964, as compared to official Chinese Communist data on those commodities in 1959. Chinese production of steel was 9.5 million metric tons in 1964 as compared with 13.3 million metric tons in 1959. An implication was made that steel production in 1963 may have been as low as 8.0 million metric tons. China's need for expansion of her steel-making capacity was recognized in December 1965 when she arranged

¹Alexander Eckstein, "Economic Progress of Communist China," The United States and Communist China, pp. 1-7.

²Ibid.

to buy a modern steel plant, using an oxygen rather than a coal process, from Austria. In March 1966, the West German government approved an \$87 million credit guarantee for China toward the construction of a steel mill which will have a two-million-ton capacity and cost \$150 million.³ Other equipment to expand or improve her industry is being purchased from other western European countries (Italy and Great Britain). Only 209 million metric tons of coal were produced in 1964 compared to 347.8 million in 1959. For grain, the basic foodstuff of the Chinese, the output was only 180 million metric tons in 1964, one-third below the 270 million tons reported in 1959. The conclusion is quite clear that, according to Soviet estimates, Chinese economy in the mid-1960's is still, on the whole, much weaker than it was in 1959.⁴

Communist China and the USSR are actively competing for Japanese trade, each with the obvious purpose of reducing the other's access to the huge Japanese industrial complex. In the past four years, Sino-Japanese trade has quintupled to an estimated level of \$470 million, and is expected to increase another 15 per cent in 1966. Nearly 15 per cent of China's total trade is with the Japanese, while Japan's total trade with China approximates three per cent of Japan's exports.⁵ During the first ten months of 1965, Japan exported \$307 million to China

³ Richard Eder, "Rusk Scores Bonn on Mill for China," New York Times, 21 Mar. 1966, p. 1.

⁴ "Soviet Data Show a Weakened China," New York Times, 5 Dec. 1965, p. 40.

⁵ Stanley Karnow, "Japan to Lead Red China Trade in 1966," Washington Post, 13 Jan. 1966, p. E-6.

and imported \$194 million in commodities, a 60 per cent trade increase over the same period of 1964.⁶ On 27 December 1965, a Sino-Japanese trade agreement was signed. This agreement provided for the export to China in 1966 of \$15 million in steel products alone, an increase of \$2.75 million over 1965.⁷

In terms of modern industrial power, Communist China is still in a primitive state of development. She is still basically an agricultural country. While new mineral resources have been discovered, they have yet to be fully developed. China does not have a modern armament industry that is capable of sustaining her military forces in extended warfare. The transportation system is limited, with only about 280,000 miles of highways and 19,000 miles of railroads. The transportation system is inadequate by modern standards. Truck production is not more than 23,000 vehicles per year. Despite newly developed oil fields, production is low and the availability of pipelines for oil and natural gas is minimal at best. Yet, on 2 January 1966, China announced the completion of the Taching Oil Fields in northern China, begun in 1960, and claimed that she is now self-sufficient in petroleum production.⁸ Her electric power industry, while growing, is still relatively small. Steel output

⁶"Japanese-Red Chinese Deal," New York Times, 29 Dec. 1965, p. 47.

⁷"Japan's Red Bloc Trade Jumps 60% in 10 Months," Washington Post, p. A-15.

⁸"Red China Self-Sufficient in Petroleum," New York Times, 3 Jan. 1966, p. 3.

is small, unable to meet fully its own immediate economic needs. Aircraft, motor, chemical, or machinery industries are still in the early stages of development.

In 1965 China had to import six million tons of food grains to feed her population and build up a reserve. Two-thirds of her purchases from non-Communist nations cover imports of grain, raw cotton, and fertilizer; the remaining third cover oil-refining, chemical fertilizer, and synthetic fabric plants. About \$120 million is being expended to import chemical fertilizers.⁹

Yet, ironically, in the face of her economic difficulties, China is competing with the USSR for economic influence and control in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. During the period of 1954-1963, a total of \$446.0 million had been programmed as economic aid to countries on these continents. In 1964 alone, China concluded twenty economic and technical aid agreements with sixteen Asian and African nations, and committed \$138.0 million for economic aid. Economic missions were sent to 36 nations and China invited 256 cultural and scientific missions from 76 countries as a part of this program. Such activity is increasing year by year.¹⁰

All is not going as smoothly as these statistics would indicate. In early 1966, Cuba reduced her planned exchange of goods with China from \$250 million to \$170 million. The issue

⁹"Red China: 'Paper Tiger?'," U.S. News and World Report, 25 Oct. 1965, pp. 40-44.

¹⁰Hwang Tien-chien, "The Lasting Crisis on Mainland China in 1964," APACL, May 1965, p. 63

principally involved the reduced trading of Cuban sugar for Chinese rice. However, the move has been interpreted by many as China's decision to punish Cuba for its pro-Soviet position in the Communist movement. If so, then it reveals rather forcefully China's capability to use economic warfare for political gain. If successful, such tactics may well be the pattern of the immediate future in the fight for world Communist leadership.¹¹

Prior to the Communist takeover in China, Chinese industry was concentrated in the eastern part of the country. Concerted efforts have been made subsequently to disperse the industry into the interior, primarily near the sources of raw materials. While considerable progress has been made, there are still concentrations of industry in a few major cities and in Manchuria.¹²

Concentrated Soviet aid assisted the Chinese considerably, especially during the early period of their economic development. In the late 1950's, at the time of peak Soviet-Chinese trade, the most important Chinese imports were machinery and equipment for China's industrialization, and essential supplies of petroleum. The Soviets, in turn, received mineral raw materials, textiles, clothing, and substantial quantities of food. Credits for economic aid to China, equated in terms of excess Soviet exports over Chinese imports during the period of 1950-1955, amounted to nearly one billion dollars. China was the largest recipient of

¹¹"China Cuts Back Trade with Cuba," New York Times, 2 Jan. 1966, p. 1.

¹²Jen Yu-ti, A Concise Geography of China, pp. 51-55.

Soviet loans and credits and its principal trading partner. The scope of this activity was revealed to some degree in the exchange of charges and countercharges in the course of their political dispute, which rages even now.

On 7 May 1964, Pravda boasted:

The total of the 11 long-term credits extended to China under favorable conditions during 1950-1962 amounted to 1,816,000,000 rubles . . . Tens of thousands of sets of scientific and technical documents were given to China . . . The USSR helped the Chinese Peoples' Republic equip more than 200 large industrial enterprises, shops, and activities with the latest technology.

The Peking Review, on 8 May 1964, responded in part by saying:

The Soviet loans to China were used mostly for the purchase of material from the Soviet Union, the greater portion of which were used in the war against US aggression and aid to Korea. For many years, we have been paying the principal and interest on these Soviet loans which account for a considerable part of our yearly exports to the Soviet Union . . . You [Soviet Union] unscrupulously withdrew 1,390 Soviet experts working in China (August 1960), tore up 343 contracts and supplementary contracts concerning these experts and scrapped 257 projects of scientific and technical cooperation in a short span of a month . . . Soviet experts were posted in over 250 enterprises and establishments in economic, national defense, culture, education, and scientific research projects and were involved in assignments related to technical design, construction projects, equipment installation and test production. Your [USSR] perfidious action disrupted China's original national economic plan and inflicted enormous losses upon China's socialist construction.

Available statistics reveal the steady decline in Sino-Soviet trade since the peak was reached in 1960, the year that the Sino-Soviet dispute erupted into the open. (Annex C)

Whatever the economic relationships of the future, it appears unlikely that, insofar as China is concerned, it will ever take the form which developed during the period of 1950-1959, particularly in depending so heavily on the USSR. China has learned its lesson well and will not deliberately repeat the same mistake again, regardless of her own economic stature. As if to lend emphasis to this philosophy, the Chinese announced in June 1965 that they had liquidated all their debts, including interest, with the Soviet government in the amount of 1.406 billion rubles (one ruble equals US \$1.11).¹³

The Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister of Communist China, Chen Yi, at a press conference in Peking on 29 September 1965, blamed China's economic problems on "natural disasters, blockade imposed by the US imperialists, and the withdrawal of aid by Krushchev." While industrial and agricultural production have been slowly rising, Chen Yi admitted categorically that "it will take decades . . . 30 to 50 years more . . . of efforts to build up China's industry, agriculture, and national defense and raise them to a higher level."¹⁴

How are the Chinese addressing this problem? One primary area is that of the trade unions. The 16 national trade unions, embracing people employed in education and continuing through

¹³Tseng Yun, "How China Carries Out the Policy of Self-Reliance," Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 25, 18 Jun. 1965, pp. 12-15.

¹⁴Chen Yi, Press Conference, 29 Sept. 1965.

the spectrum to heavy industry, is a formidable source of strength for the Communist leaders. Membership on 1 May 1965 totalled more than 20 million. Any degree of success achieved in the third Five Year Plan will be directly related to the manner in which the trade unions perform their political and ideological work among the working classes.¹⁵

Next we have China's Five Year Plan. The implementation of a new Five Year Plan, scheduled to begin in 1966, has already been postponed. A diplomatic observer stated in Peking in early January of 1966 that "at best, their Five Year Plan will be a collection of five one-year plans."¹⁶ China is on the horns of a dilemma as she views the Vietnam war on her borders and the weak state of her own economy. She lacks the natural resources to produce both guns and butter, and cannot easily shift her economic gears from peacetime to wartime priorities. Her population growth, increasing by 13 million a year, and her low industrial output are causes for deep concern.

With a \$40 to \$50 billion economy and its large population as power assets, Communist China has a significant power potential in the Asian context. Despite the economic crisis which she experienced during 1959-1962, China has been giving high priority to the modernization of her military force. She has

¹⁵"China's Trade Unions," Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 18, 30 Apr. 1965, -pp. 22-25.

¹⁶Stanley Karnow, "Red Chinese Postpone Economic Planning," Washington Post, 16 Jan. 1966, p. 1-1.

diverted skilled resources and the best manpower into developing military technology. Special efforts have been made in developing an aircraft industry, in the electronics field, in anti-aircraft development, and in naval and submarine fields. Whether this imbalance between the allocation of resources for military as opposed to civilian uses ultimately affects her industrial growth capability remains to be seen. The Sino-Soviet dispute may have been one of several factors which accelerated a desire to achieve military parity with the great neighbor to the north. The road to such parity will be hard and long.

SOVIET UNION

Pre-revolutionary Russia had a sizeable industry on which the Soviets based their programs for economic advancement. It had fairly well-developed oil and coal industries; it produced iron, steel, and other metals and certain types of machinery. The Soviets soon discovered, however, that the industrial structure was disproportionately small in comparison with the country's requirements and its natural resources and manpower potential. The early Five Year Plans addressed this imbalance from the beginning. The first plan was devoted to construction, and the second plan to the expansion of new industries and the application of new techniques. The Five Year Plans have symbolized Soviet economic development since the 1920's. The sixth Five Year Plan

was inaugurated in 1956, but it was superseded in 1959 by the Seven Year Plan of 1959-1965.

Between 1953 and 1964, a vast technological revolution took place in Soviet industry, with resulting great increases in productivity. In these years the Soviet Union became not only a fully modern military power, with all of the latest weapons created by science at its command, but it partially built and partially bought abroad a merchant fleet, thus making it one of the world's great marine powers. It has also acquired a jet-powered civil aviation system that is fully comparable with that of any other nation. The most important Soviet accomplishment is probably the huge expansion of Soviet higher education and the rapid rise in trained personnel, particularly scientists and technicians.¹⁷

Modern technical advances have changed and continue to change the economic portrait of the USSR. It is no longer the vast, sprawling, underdeveloped land of two decades ago. While empty spaces still remain, virgin lands are being broken for farming, new mines are being opened, and industrial cities are beginning to grow. Despite certain economic deficiencies, the USSR today is regarded as one of the more advanced industrial nations of the world.

The Soviet Union is well endowed with natural, mineral, and water resources. One-fifth of the world's production of

17

Harry Schwartz, The Red Phoenix, p. 233.

bituminous coal, 27 per cent of the world's output of iron, and 14 per cent of the world's oil production come from the USSR. Although three-quarters of Soviet industry lies in the Urals and European Russia, a gradual industrial shift has been going on for the past generation to the east into Central Asia, eastern Siberia, and the Far East.

Railroads still carry a heavy share of all traffic, about three-fourths of the total amount, over 78,000 route miles. Water transport is the second largest hauler of goods via 84,000 miles of inland waterways. Roads with a paved or prepared surface comprise one-fifth of the 850,000 miles available. The lack of a good, integrated road network, particularly in the less developed areas of the country, as in Siberia, poses a serious movement problem. Civil airways connect all major Soviet cities and reach into the remotest areas of Asia and the Arctic. They span more space than any other form of transportation.

International rail traffic between the USSR and China began on 1 January 1956 over the single track route through Mongolia, on the axis of Ulan-Ude-Ulan Bator-Chining (Soviet broad gauge to Erh-lien, China). A second rail route is through Sinkiang along the axis of Uch-Aral-Yumen. A third connects the USSR with China from the Trans-Siberian rail line along the line Tarskiy-Yakoshih, the short cut across Manchuria over the old Chinese Eastern Railway to Vladivostok.

As for highways, roads cross over the mountains into Sinkiang, China, from Say Tash over the Pamir Highway to Kashgar;

and from Ayaguz to Chuguchak and Urumchi. The latter was used for carrying equipment between the two countries in World War II. Coming through Mongolia, the Chuya highway from Bisk via Inya is probably one of the more important routes, along with the Usa highway from Minusinsk via Kyzyl (Tannu Tuva) to Kahdthal, and the Ulan Ude-Ulan Bator highway that parallels the railroad. In Manchuria, an important highway runs from the Trans-Siberian Railroad at Bolshoy Never via Aldan to Yakutsk; the Ussuri highway extends from Kabarovsk to Vladivostok; and the Kolyma highway runs from the port of Magadan to Upper Kolyma.

The point to be made regarding all these routes is that they are affected by seasonal climatic changes. Rains, floods, and particularly permafrost would, with few exceptions, affect the trafficability along these mountainous border areas in any modern military operation. For the type and amount of commerce generated, they are presently adequate to meet the needs of both countries.¹⁸

Although neither Japan nor the USSR has been able to agree on acceptable terms for a peace treaty, an agreement in 1956 ended the state of war between them. On 21 January 1966, Japan and the USSR signed an aviation pact and a new five-year trade agreement worth \$2.25 billion over the five-year period. If fully implemented, Soviet exports to Japan will increase in 1966 by six per cent to \$200 million and Japanese exports to the Soviet

¹⁸Jesse H. Wheeler, Jr., and others, Regional Geography of the World, pp. 307-361.

Union will rise 12 per cent to \$190 million. The aviation agreement makes the Japan Air Lines the first foreign carrier to have permission to overfly Siberia on air flights to European capitals, even though JAL will be required to use Soviet planes and joint crews for the first two years. In addition, a consular treaty, expansion of coastal trade across the Sea of Japan, and increased cultural and scientific exchanges are in the offing.

These developments reveal the degree to which both the USSR and Communist China are competing for political and economic influence, and in developing good trade relations with Japan. China's objective is to build her own economy, and to reduce her dependence on the USSR; the Soviet Union's primary aim is to neutralize the role of Japan in the Far East, particularly as it affects Communist China, while simultaneously expediting the development of Siberia.

Such economic competition is actively going on in other parts of the world. By the beginning of 1965, the Soviet Union had agreements on economic and technical cooperation with the governments of almost 30 countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Within the Communist camp itself, in the period 1957-1964, more than 26,000 Soviet-technical specialists have been employed in economic projects, with Soviet credits granted to these countries exceeding \$9 billion. At this point, the USSR is too deeply involved and committed to change its policy of economic aid to developing countries. Domestic pressures may restrict the nature and scope of such foreign aid; however,

Soviet investment is too heavy to abandon such major recipients as India, Egypt, Indonesia, Afghanistan, and Algeria. These nations account for three-fourths of the total Soviet commitments.¹⁹

In January 1966, the Soviet government announced that the declining industrial production growth rate had been reversed in 1965. The rate rose from 7.1 per cent in 1964 to 8.6 per cent in 1965, about the level of 1963. Wages of industrial workers increased, but farm output suffered a sharp drop in growth rate--from 12 per cent in 1964 to only one per cent in 1965. The other major accomplishment in 1965 was the almost six per cent gain in average wages of industrial workers. Soviet national income increased from \$180 billion in 1963 to \$202 billion in 1964, a gain of \$14 billion (based on official exchange rate). The per capita income in 1964 was \$885.²⁰ The average annual earnings of Soviet workers last year was equivalent to \$25 a week.²¹

Economic problems continue to plague Soviet leaders. The population expansion coupled with public pressure for higher standards of living have created a situation in which Soviet agriculture has failed to keep pace with the growing need for food and raw materials. The Soviets purchased almost 10 million tons of grain from Western countries in 1965 to meet their needs.

¹⁹"Foreign Aid Is Cut Back by Russia," Washington Post, 2 Mar. 1966, p. A-10.

²⁰Harry Schwartz, "Soviet Economic Report: A Mixed Record," New York Times, 6 Feb. 1966, p. E-3.

²¹Harry Schwartz, "Soviet Concedes Lag in Prosperity," New York Times, 13 Mar. 1966, p. 10.

Evidence shows, too, that the use of available resources of manpower, raw materials, and machinery has been grossly inefficient.

Under the new leadership of the Communist Party, First Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev and Premier Aleksei Kosygin, emphasis is to be placed on the shift of industry to new industrial planning and economic management techniques, with priority to be given to producer and consumer goods. Power, chemicals, engineering, precision engineering, oil, and natural gas production will also receive priority.²²

To overcome persistent agricultural deficiencies, the Achilles heel of Soviet economy, the Ministry of Agriculture has been reactivated by the Soviets to deal with problems of economic planning, pricing, and scientific experimentation. The Five Year Plan of 1966-1970 provides for increased incentives on collective and state farms, expanded production and sales of products, financial aid to collective farms, increased pay to workers, absorption of land improvement costs by the state budget, and general improvement of the living standards of farmers. A major expansion of mechanization will also take place by providing modern trucks, tractors, combines, and other related equipment. The plan is ambitious. For example, agricultural output is to be increased by 25 per cent over the

²²A. V. Bachurin, Deputy Chairman, USSR State Planning Commission, "The Soviet Economy, 1966," New Times, No. 51, 22 Dec. 1965, pp. 4-5.

average of the past five years.²³ Revolutionary procedures must be used if the agricultural goals are to be achieved.²⁴

The Soviet Union anticipates an income of 105.4 billion rubles (\$115.9 billion) and total expenditures of 105.3 billion rubles (\$115.6 billion) for 1966, more than double that of Communist China under the most optimistic estimates. Industrial growth rate is targeted at 6.7 per cent or below the average industrial growth rates of previous years which have dropped from 9.2 to 7.1 per cent.²⁵

Increases for 1966 are programmed for light industry (up 22%) and agriculture (up 8-10%). Exploitation of natural resources east of the Urals will receive priority. Profits will play a much bigger part in the budget and should provide more incentive for the workers. The Soviets hope to increase living standards to 6.4 per cent (six per cent in 1965), with about 80 per cent of the national income earmarked for internal consumption. Automobile production is to be increased from 200,000 in 1965 to 800,000 in 1980. While it may be some time before the USSR develops into a car-oriented economy on the western pattern, the growth of car ownership will have a considerable impact on social development.²⁶

²³Victor Zorza, "Soviet Five-Year Plan Revised for More Realistic Goals," Washington Post, 30 Mar. 1966, p. K-3.

²⁴Vladimir Matskevich, "The Past, Present, and Future of Soviet Agriculture," Izvestia, 25 Aug. 1965, p. 1.

²⁵"Russia Says Its Defense Budget Is Up," Washington Post, 8 Dec. 1965, p. A-1.

²⁶Zorza, op. cit.

By western standards, the Soviet economy since 1960 has performed rather poorly. The record of unsatisfactory economic progress and retarded industrial production growth during this period undoubtedly contributed to the removal, in October 1964, of Nikita S. Krushchev from his posts as First Secretary of the Communist Party, Premier of the USSR, and member of the Party's ruling Presidium. Yet there is no comparison between the economic postures of the USSR and Communist China. China's economy is today on the level of that of the USSR in the 1930's. The Soviet Gross National Product (GNP) (\$270 billion) is the second largest in the world. It is more than four times larger than that of China, less than \$50 billion, and is almost two-thirds of the total GNP of all Communist states. The USSR is still trading with China, albeit on a reduced, highly selective, and entirely businesslike basis. The trade protocol signed in Moscow on 29 April 1965 revealed the nature of Sino-Soviet trade. The USSR would furnish such items as machine tools, airplanes, helicopters, motor vehicles, industrial equipment and spare parts, etc., in exchange from China for leather goods, pork, shoes, fruits, industrial raw materials, etc.²⁷ China is purchasing civil aircraft from the Soviet Union in order to expand her inadequate air fleet, and because of her inability to meet this need in her own industry. Communist China has a long way to go before she can reach the economic level of the USSR. At this point in time, there is no contest.

²⁷"Trade Talks End," Pravda, 30 Apr. 1965, p. 5.

CHAPTER 7

MILITARY

COMMUNIST CHINA'S ARMED FORCES

China has been almost continuously involved in wars and revolutions since 1911, although there has been no large-scale fighting since the conclusion of the Korean War in 1953. For a century prior to World War II, China was dominated by various other nations, and at times was virtually reduced to a colonial status. This fact is bitterly resented by many Chinese. The emphasis placed by Mao Tse-tung on building a reliable, effective military force recognizes the historic military weakness of China.

Communist China's armed forces are collectively designated as the Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA). They have the traditional mission of national defense and support of the government's foreign policy, and are essentially an instrument of party dictatorship. The party control extends from the Politburo (Military Affairs Committee) through the military and party chain of command to the basic units of the armed forces, of which one-third are members of the party. They also function as a massive labor force to support economic projects of the party and as a medium of mass indoctrination.¹

¹Ralph L. Powell, "Communist China's Military Potential," Current History, Vol. 47, No. 277, Sep.-1964, pp. 136-142.

Lin Piao, Vice-Chairman of the Military Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, in announcing the five objectives for the PLA for 1966, referred to Mao Tse-tung's philosophy in building an army. This philosophy puts politics in first place and places military affairs under the guidance and command of politics. It regards men as more important than weapons in deciding revolutionary struggles. It asserts that wars of national liberation will not lead to general nuclear war.²

Little official data is available as to the defense budget of China. It is estimated that between 1962 and 1965, China spent an average of more than 10 per cent of its Gross National Product on military products.³

In terms of manpower, estimates show that, as of 1 July 1964, there were 140.4 million males of military age in China. However, low economic productivity, low health standards, and demands for political reliability vastly reduce the number that can be effectively mobilized for military service. Only 700,000 men or less are drafted each year under the highly selective recruiting program that is now in effect. As a general characteristic of the Chinese soldier, basic literacy has replaced illiteracy as one of the primary objectives in the armed forces.⁴

²"PLA's Work for 1966," Peking Review, No. 49, 3 Dec. 1965, pp. 3-4.

³"NATO Told of Peking's Strength," Washington Post, 16 Dec. 1965, p. A-1.

⁴Powell, op. cit.

China can mobilize 10 million men between the ages of 18 to 22 and can replenish at the rate of 4.4 million per year for three years. Under full mobilization conditions, she can field 300 to 400 divisions.

The Army, with about 2.3 million men, is organized into 30 field armies, each composed of three infantry divisions. The armies are distributed throughout 13 military regions. China has about 115 infantry divisions, four armored divisions, two airborne divisions, supporting troops, and desert cavalry. Some mountain units may be located in Tibet.⁵ Since 1960, about one-fifth of China's regular forces, approximately 450,000 men, have been deployed along the Soviet frontier from Sinkiang to Manchuria. Facing them on the other side of this frontier are some 39 Soviet divisions in Soviet Asia and the Far East plus air and rocket forces which comprise slightly under one-third of the total Soviet regular forces.⁶

As a conventional military force, the Army is adequately equipped with Soviet arms and equipment of World War II vintage delivered prior to 1960, or with Chinese equipment manufactured since that date, of Soviet design. Included are small arms, a range of artillery up to 155mm caliber, 160mm mortars, and T-54 medium and JS-2 type heavy tanks. The PLA does not yet have a

⁵Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1965-66, pp. 8-11.

⁶"China: Dangers of Misunderstanding," Newsweek, Vol. 68, No. 10, 7 Mar. 1966, pp. 35-43.

nuclear offensive or defensive capability. However, under the intensified program now in progress, the Chinese can develop medium-range missiles which could be operational as early as 1967, and could deploy several dozen medium-range nuclear missiles by 1968. They have already begun a program for the development of intercontinental missiles which could be deployed as early as 1975.⁷

Although infantry weapons, light and medium mortars, recoilless rifles, and light and medium artillery produced in China are available for their needs, the PLA suffers from inadequate organization, a poor logistical support system, and obsolescence and shortages of equipment, particularly motor transport and armor. POL is also in short supply. The Chinese airlift capability is probably limited to a few battalions.

The greatest strength of the PLA lies in its massive size. It can be employed for either military or psychological aggression. Its greatest weakness is its inability at present to produce its own conventional weapons at the scale needed to sustain this large force.⁸

In a move to improve unity and morale, ranks and insignia were abolished and uniforms of the three services were made similar in style in June 1965. Despite such action, reports in early 1966 indicated some resistance by senior officers to

⁷"NATO Told of Peking's Strength," Washington Post, 16 Dec. 1965, p. A-1.

⁸Powell, op. cit.

attempts to strengthen the role of political commissars within Army units. This was the result of a drive to reinforce political control over the armed forces. Such dissension would be, in essence, an intra-Party dispute rather than a schism between the Army and the Party. It is unlikely to reduce Army effectiveness not only because of Party unity but because, basically, the Chinese, faced with an external threat, are deeply Chinese.⁹

Efforts are being made to overcome weapon deficiencies by expanding the armament industry. Communist China is said to now have 35 aircraft factories, 129 arms factories, and two plants for the production of military vehicles. One aircraft factory in Mukden is believed to have a capability to assemble 30 MIG-17 and perhaps the more advanced MIG-21 jet fighters per month. The most important arms factory, in Mukden, produces machine guns, tanks, mortars, anti-aircraft cannon, recoilless guns, and heavy machine guns. Changchun is the site of the largest automobile factory, which manufactures three and five ton military trucks.¹⁰

The Air Force, with 100,000 men, has up to 2,300 aircraft (1,700-2,000 jets) including MIG-15, 17, 19, and a few 21's; a small force (about 300) of IL-28 light bombers; some IL-18 transports; and a few miscellaneous craft. If the Chinese atomic bomb is developed early, the IL-28 and the TU-4 would be

⁹Stanley Karnow, "Peking's Drive Implies Fears of 'Revisionism'," Washington Post, 2 Mar. 1966, p. A-8.

¹⁰"Communist China—Armament Industry," Military Review, Jan. 1965, p. 105.

the bombers to which the delivery capability would be tailored. The Civil Air Bureau, with 350 aircraft, could supplement the air force capability. Pilot training is limited and inhibited, and there is a shortage of spare parts and aviation fuel. The Air Force, while primarily defensive in nature, can support tactical ground operations; however, its effectiveness is diminished by its obsolescence and vulnerability.

The Navy, with 136,000 men, including the Naval Air Force and the Marines, is the weakest of the armed services and is composed mainly of coastal vessels and patrol boats. It has about 23 W-class submarines and seven other submarines (formerly Soviet), four destroyers, four destroyer escorts, 800 other vessels, and a naval air arm with about 500 naval aircraft, mainly MIG fighters and IL-28 torpedo-carrying jet light bombers. The Chinese Navy has a limited amphibious warfare capability but does possess a significant mine-laying capability.¹¹ China has one missile-launching submarine (with three tubes) but no missiles.¹²

A para-military force (frontier guard and internal security) of about 300,000 men, and a civilian militia of up to 200 million men, reinforces the armed services as a partially trained manpower pool.

¹¹Institute for Strategic Studies, op. cit.

¹²Hanson W. Baldwin, "China's Atomic Potential," New York Times, 15 Mar. 1966, p. 2.

The combined armed force strength of 2.5 million men, supported by the militia, has a limited conventional war capability. The efforts at modernization of the armed forces and the inclusion of nuclear weapons in its military arsenal will improve China's defensive and offensive military posture. Until this modernization is accomplished, Chinese armed forces, handicapped by the lack of naval and air power, will be limited to ground operations on the periphery of China.

COMMUNIST CHINESE MILITARY STRATEGY

It is now apparent that Communist China no longer credits the USSR with providing a nuclear umbrella over either China or the revolutionary wars. The strategic deployment of her military forces is essentially defensive in nature and has changed little during the past decade. Nearly one million men are deployed in the southeast, facing the Nationalist forces on Taiwan; up to 400,000 are stationed in the areas bordering Vietnam, Laos, and Burma; about 75,000 are located along the Tibetan border with India; 450,000 are deployed along the Soviet border from Sinkiang to Manchuria; and the remainder, about 500,000, are garrisoned around Peking and Inner Mongolia.¹³

China's capability for waging a conventional war is limited. She is not yet a nuclear power, although she has detonated two

¹³"China: Dangers of Misunderstanding," Newsweek, Vol. 68, No. 10, 7 Mar. 1966, pp. 35-43.

atomic devices and may detonate the third, possibly a hydrogen weapon, in 1966. Experts agree that China could develop operational medium-range missiles by 1967 and that, by 1975, she could develop intercontinental missiles (ICBM) which would pose a significant threat against any potential enemy. There will probably be no change in her defensive doctrine until China can develop a credible nuclear deterrent which would include a sophisticated delivery system and related command and control systems.

Since the first atomic detonation, the Chinese have emphasized that the first step in any nuclear arms control agreement must be a pledge by all nuclear and potential nuclear powers not to use nuclear weapons against each other or against non-nuclear nations. Further, the Chinese have stated that China would never be the first to use nuclear weapons. Until China has developed her own nuclear arsenal, there is little likelihood that she will participate in any nuclear arms control agreement.¹⁴

Chinese leaders maintain that, with her great land mass, her vast population, and the dispersal of her industry, China could not be defeated by long-range nuclear weapons, even if these were combined with bacteriological and chemical warfare. There is no indication that this concept has been modified since the Chinese began their own atomic testing.

¹⁴Anne M. Jonas, "The Nuclear World of Mao Tse-tung," Air Force and Space Digest, Vol. 49, No. 2, Feb. 1966, p. 79

There has been a renewed emphasis on Maoist revolutionary military theory. This theory envisions that any ground invasion of China would be fought under Mao Tse-tung's concept of "people's war," i. e., a protracted war fought by both the large regular armed forces and the massive militia that has been developed under the slogan, "Everyone, a soldier." The Chinese argue that nuclear weapons do not apply to wars of national liberation.

Thus, China's military philosophy, during the period in which the country is being reconstructed, is one of defensive strategy. It has been so since 1961 when planning called for the improvement of air defenses and communications and defensive works as well as dispersion, camouflage, and hardening of military installations. Communist China cannot hope to match the military and economic might of the Soviet Union. But a nuclear armed China will become a potential threat to the USSR, a threat which can affect strategy in Asia. Meanwhile, China is relying on her shrewd calculation of the deep and widespread aversion to the use of nuclear weapons which is providing the umbrella of protection needed during the country's development.¹⁵

SOVIET ARMED FORCES

The Soviet Union, like China, also has a long history of wars and revolutions that goes back for centuries. Since

¹⁵Ralph L. Powell, "Great Powers and Atomic Bombs Are 'Paper Tigers'," The China Quarterly, No. 23, Jul.-Sep. 1965, pp. 55-63.

World War II, it has created and maintained a formidable military force in being, both for the protection of its territorial integrity as the largest nation in the world, and as an extension of its foreign policy.

The Soviet armed forces are composed of ground, naval, air, and strategic rocket elements, supported by a para-military force that includes security and border troops. The total of approximately 3.2 million men in the armed forces, plus 230,000 para-military forces, and reinforced by 1.5 million DOSAAF members participating actively in para-military training, makes it the most formidable military force in the world today. The Soviet annual budget over the past several years approximated \$35 to \$40 billion in military expenditures, including funds for space research and advanced weapons systems. On 7 December 1965, the Soviets announced a five per cent increase in defense spending for 1966.¹⁶

The Soviet Army, with about 2.0 million men, is organized into 140 divisions (90 motorized; 50 tank) plus seven airborne divisions. Under the Soviet system of three categories of combat readiness, about one-half of the 140 divisions are at or near full combat strength. The bulk of these forces are positioned on the European continent (75 in European Russia; 22 in Central Russia), 17 divisions in the Far East, and 26 divisions in

¹⁶"Kosygin Says US Policy Foments War and Forces Soviet Arms Budget Rise," New York Times, 8 Dec. 1965, p. A-1.

European satellite countries.¹⁷ Since the beginning of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Soviet Army divisions that are stationed between Lake Baikal and Vladivostok have conducted maneuvers close to the Chinese borders. In addition, Soviet Army troops have been used to guard key bridges and tunnels on the Trans-Siberian Railroad.¹⁸

The Army is well-trained and equipped with the latest weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons, and it has undergone maneuvers in simulated nuclear warfare situations. It is capable of both offensive and defensive chemical warfare. The Army's equipment includes the full range of artillery, medium and heavy tanks, and tactical missiles with ranges from 10 to 300 miles.

The Soviet naval strength of 460,000 men, combined with gross ship tonnage, makes the Soviet Navy the second largest in the world. Its main strength is in the submarine fleet. Soviet naval power consists of 22 cruisers, 150 destroyers, 35 nuclear-powered and 390 conventional-powered submarines (120 in the Far East), 100 frigates, and 700 minesweepers. Smaller Soviet craft include 250 escort and patrol vessels, 350 motor torpedo boats, 550 motor gunboats, 130 landing craft, 300 auxiliaries, and 200 service vessels.¹⁹ While there are no aircraft carriers, there is a naval air arm with 800 aircraft.

¹⁷Institute for Strategic Studies, op. cit.

¹⁸"The World in a Mess," U. S. News and World Report, Vol. 59, 6 Dec. 1965, p. 44.

¹⁹Jane's Fighting Ships as quoted by New York Times, 13 Dec. 1965, p. 6.

The naval air arm is primarily a land-based force. There is also a small Marine Corps, about 3,000 men, which was re-established as a force in the summer of 1964. The Soviet Navy has concentrated recently on the production of missile-firing destroyers, anti-submarine frigates, and nuclear-powered submarines. The Soviet Union, more and more, is using its merchant ships in a naval role, and probably considers its merchant marine as a vital fourth arm of defense in emergencies.

The Soviet Air Force, with a strength of 510,000 men, has about 10,500 operational aircraft. It is organized into four operating forces: (1) a long-range force with 1,600 planes possessing limited intercontinental range; (2) a tactical air force with 4,000 planes for use in a direct tactical ground support role; (3) an Air Defense force of 250,000 men and 6,000 aircraft for internal defense; and (4) an Air Transport force. The Transport force could airlift two airborne divisions with supporting elements to short and mid-range objectives. Air bases are located predominantly in western European Russia, the Ukraine, and the Far East.

The Strategic Rocket Forces number approximately 180,000 men. They are believed to be equipped with about 270 long-range operational ICBM's, 700-750 MRBM's and IRBM's (ranges 1,000 to 2,100 statute miles). The majority of the MRBM's and IRBM's are based near the western, southern, and eastern borders of European Russia, on the Pacific coast, and in Siberia. Hardened sites have been developed.

The Security and Border Troops have a strength of 230,000 men and they are positioned along the frontiers of the Soviet Union. In addition, an estimated 1.5 million DOSAAF members participate in para-military training as a ready back-up force for the regular armed forces.

The Soviet armed forces can undertake both offensive and defensive warfare, either conventional or nuclear. They are capable of repelling any attack on Soviet territory by one or a combination of military forces. They can launch a major military offensive, either conventional or nuclear, by land, sea, or air but they have a limited capability against a concerted multidirectional attack by a determined nuclear-supported force. The Soviet armed forces could repel any invasion of its territory by the Chinese Communists and, in the event of a general war with that country, would be able to defeat any military force which the Chinese could deploy in the field.

SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY

Soviet military strategy has been undergoing fairly open debate since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The Strategic Rocket Force concept was re-examined during 1965 and evidently found to be inadequate. The Soviet military leaders in 1966 accept the premise that a global war need not necessarily be a short one, even though strategic missiles could be the decisive factor in the opening stages of a war. The strategy provides not only increased mobility in the employment of strategic

missiles, but also greater balance between all branches of the armed forces which will give the conventional forces a more dynamic and mobile role in the conduct of war. Firepower and mobility of these forces are to be increased. Interest in long-range strategic aircraft is also being revived as the Soviets strive for balanced military development.²⁰

Being more powerful than China in all aspects of military strength, the Soviet Union has nothing to fear from direct Chinese aggression. Despite China's entry into the nuclear club, the gap in number strength is not expected to narrow appreciably in the foreseeable future. The new Soviet military strategy of balanced forces provides the USSR with a capability for coping with any type of war or invasion—strategic, nuclear, or conventional—which may threaten the integrity of her borders.

Communist China is unlikely to ignore these Soviet military developments. She is acutely aware that her Communist neighbor to the north is not just a "paper tiger." In being prepared for both nuclear and "peoples' war" concepts of warfare, the Soviet Union regains the ability to handle small-scale wars as well as nuclear conflicts. Soviet Communist Party plans provide that the 1966-70 Five Year Plan "shall insure a further growth of Soviet defense potential in supplying most modern types of weapons to our armed forces."²¹ The USSR expects to be ready for any contingency and is prepared to pay the price.

²⁰ Albert Boiter, Major Trends in Soviet Developments Since Krushchev, pp. 47-48.

²¹ Jerry R. Bradsher, "Secret Soviet Defense Outlay Hike Reported," Patriot, 21 Mar. 1966, p. 1.

CHAPTER 8

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

COMMUNIST CHINESE DEVELOPMENTS

Communist China is still in its infancy in both industrial and military technology. However, with the earlier Soviet assistance, she, is taking giant strides in striving to attain a high degree of proficiency in advanced science technology. Information on Chinese military science and technology is meager at best, and estimates as to her capability in this field also vary widely. Nevertheless, there are indications that, despite China's technical backwardness, her concentration upon nuclear and rocket development is resulting in accelerated progress. Appropriations for scientific research have increased from \$16 million in 1955 to \$340 million in 1959, with estimates that \$2 billion have been spent since 1960.

A task force of Japanese experts points out that abundant electric power is available at China's uranium concentration plant near Lanchou in Kansu Province, in western China. Further, that if only 1.45 million kilowatts of Kansu's total capacity of 5.2 million kilowatts were used, China could produce 760 kilograms (1,672 pounds) of uranium per year. Allowing 15 kilograms (33 pounds) a bomb, China could make about 50 bombs a year from that quantity of fissionable material. The task force also estimated that China had about 200 kilograms of fissionable

material stockpiled in October 1964 when she exploded her first nuclear device. In 1963, according to Japanese information, China tested a missile with a range of 500 to 625 miles.

The most optimistic estimates indicate that China, with a concentrated effort, could have a minimum arsenal of 150 to 200 atomic bombs by the end of 1967, with production of delivery vehicles keeping pace. Further, the prediction was made that Communist China will explode its first hydrogen bomb during the first half of 1966.¹ More conservative estimates predict that China can develop operational medium-range missiles (MRBM) by 1967, employ several dozen by 1968, and have intercontinental missiles (IRBM) by 1975. The production of a missile-firing submarine within this time frame is also a predicted possibility.²

The evolution of the Chinese atomic energy project went through two phases. The first phase extended from 1950-1958, during which time China placed heavy reliance on the Soviet Union for financial, material, and technical support. The second phase began in 1959 and ended in 1965 when China became entirely self-sufficient in all phases of nuclear weapons—research, development, engineering, testing, and production.

In 1950 China had less than 900 nuclear scientists, of whom 170 were studying abroad. An accelerated training program

¹Robert S. Elegant, "Chinese H-Bomb Predicted in 1966," Washington Post, 30 Dec. 1965, p. A-9.

²"McNamara Tells NATO of Peking's Atom Strength," Washington Post, 16 Dec. 1965, p. A-1.

including student training in the USSR from 1953 to 1957, resulted in the development of 1,800 to 2,000 top-grade scientists and technicians directly employed in major phases of atom bomb production.

The terms of the Sino-Soviet Atomic Cooperation Treaty, signed on 29 April 1955, enabled China to get a 10-megawatt experimental heavy water reactor for the Peking Institute. This reactor is capable of producing enough fissionable material for a 20-kiloton bomb in a year-and-a-half. In addition, the USSR provided a cyclotron for the Peking Institute. The cyclotron was completed and operational on 27 September 1958.

During the period 1959-1963, a gaseous diffusion plant (with a 300-MWe reactor) was constructed in Lanchow in north central China. The plant could produce enough weapons-grade U-235 for a 20-kiloton atomic bomb in over a month's time. Additionally, over 40 chemical separation plants were built on the mainland for uranium and thorium extraction, and instrumentation was imported from Britain, France, and Italy during 1963-1964.

This accelerated nuclear development program produced the first Chinese atom bomb test on 16 October 1964, and a second test on 14 May 1965, both at Lop Nor in Sinkiang Province. Both devices used uranium rather than plutonium.

Western scientists are of the opinion that future Chinese explosions will intermix plutonium with uranium bombs, since

more exotic techniques do not appear to have been developed. All indications are that China is developing an H-bomb, and the delivery systems to go with—most likely, intermediate-range ballistic missiles first; then, long-range intercontinental ballistics missiles. Best estimates are that China can probably have an H-bomb in about three to four years.³ She has the atomic reactors, the scientists, and the uranium reserves in Sinkiang and Su Chuan that are the basic ingredients for exploiting atomic and nuclear energy.

There is no comparison between the Soviet Union and Communist China, where scientific and technological developments are concerned. Nevertheless, China has made considerable progress in advancing her scientific and technological skills and, with little outside help, in developing her industrial economy. The application of science and technology in military and industrial fields will continue to play a significant role in the economic programs of both nations. How fast and how far they go toward becoming major nuclear powers will depend on their domestic and international objectives and on their willingness to make sacrifices in their economic development. The choice has been made. Priority has been given to scientific and military progress at the expense of other domestic and foreign programs.

³
Lewis A. Frank, "Nuclear Weapons," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Jan. 1966, pp. 12-17.

SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS

The Soviets have had spectacular success with their space program. It began with the launching of the first satellite, Sputnik I, on 4 October 1957, and has continued to the most recent soft landing of an unmanned spacecraft on the moon on 2 February 1966. They have also completed successfully manned space flights, with one man on 12 April 1961; two men on 18 March 1965, including the first space walk; and three men on 12 October 1964.⁴

The strategic importance of science and technology in the growth of military, economic, and political power has long been recognized by the Soviet leaders. Programs for scientific and technical education and the expansion of research facilities were initiated early by Stalin and accelerated under Krushchev. The budget for scientific research has been increasing yearly. The 1966 budget for scientific research is over \$7 billion, an increase of 9.9 per cent over 1965. Scientific development remains a focal point in Soviet long-range objectives.⁵ In 1965 it was estimated that the Soviet Union had between 416,000 and 487,000 scientists and engineers and between 1 and 1.5 million people involved in scientific research. Expenditures approximated \$4.4 billion.⁶

⁴"Reds Hold Six Space Firsts," Washington Post, 5 Feb. 1966, p. A-6.

⁵Harry Schwartz, "Soviets Budget Implying Peace," New York Times, 12 Dec. 1965, p. F-1.

⁶"Soviet Equalling US in Research," New York Times, 19 Dec. 1965, p. 20.

Soviet scientists and engineers are privileged socially, and favored financially by the government. Science and technology have in the past and continue at present to receive top priority both in industrial and in military applications. Primarily, emphasis has been on the latter, particularly in space, missiles, and weapons development. Other areas such as agriculture, electrification projects, mechanization and automation of production, and conversion of thermonuclear, chemical, and solar energy into electrical energy have not to date received the degree of attention required in building up the Soviet economy. However, the forthcoming Soviet economic plans do provide for increased emphasis in these areas.

Soviet interest in rocketry can be traced to 1929 when a small research office, the "Gas Dynamic Laboratory," was established in Leningrad. Shortly thereafter, the Jet Research Institute was organized in Moscow. Work soon began on the development of ballistic and winged rockets and engines. The gunpowder-propelled rockets known as "Katyushas" during World War II, were developed here by Georgi Langemak. Professor Glushko was among the first to experiment with the use of liquid rocket fuels, such as liquid oxygen and nitric acid. Professor Korolev designed a rocket-powered glider plane (RP-318), which was ground tested in 1937-38 and flight tested with a liquid fuel rocket in 1940.⁷

⁷Theodore Shabad, "Soviet Lifts Edge of Rocket Shroud," New York Times, 7 Nov. 1965, p. 24.

Soviet rocket research and development programs are highly classified, and relatively little data has been published officially on this subject. However, since their entry into the field of interplanetary space exploration, the Soviets have revealed the use of powerful rocket booster engines that are capable of generating 60 million horsepower and developing three million pounds of thrust at takeoff. Other rocket engines are capable of launching the 26,900-pound instrumented spacecraft (Proton series) that are designed to investigate high-energy cosmic rays. (These developments compare with the U.S. Titan 3C launching of a 21,000 pound dummy satellite into orbit in June 1965, but not with the developing Saturn series with a 7.5 million-pound thrust that will generate 160 million horsepower at maximum velocity in flight.)⁸

Since November 1963, the Soviet military has paraded 13 new missile systems in its Moscow Red Square parades, including three new rocket systems (intermediate-range ballistics missiles) which were unveiled on 7 November 1965.⁹

On 13 November 1965, Colonel General Vladimir Tolubko, First Deputy Commander of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, announced the development of long-range intercontinental missiles capable of maneuvering in flight.¹⁰ Such developments tend to emphasize the fact that Soviet advances in science continue at an accelerated pace.

⁸Theodore Shabad, "Soviet Discloses Powerful Rocket," New York Times, 14 Nov. 1965, p. 74.

⁹Peter Grose, "Moscow's New Missiles More Mobile on Ground," New York Times, 8 Nov. 1965, p. 1.

¹⁰Shabad, op. cit.

CHAPTER 9

TERRITORIAL FACTORS

FRONTIER DELIMITATIONS

The single stunning aspect of the Sino-Soviet dispute is the manner in which the argument has descended from an ideological war of words to an old-fashioned power struggle over territory.

The distrust, suspicion, and open hostility between the USSR and Communist China are products of ancient rivalries along the frontier. There space is immense. There are few areas along these thinly populated frontiers, stretching over 6,000 miles, which have not been in dispute.¹ It is a paradox that Soviet Asia is rich in raw materials and is underpopulated, while China is relatively poor in raw materials and is overpopulated.

The territorial question will undoubtedly remain a factor in the relations between these two socialist states. The Chinese claim that Czarist Russia, over the centuries, detached about 700,000 square miles of territory from China. The Chinese have made an implied demand that this territory be returned. Among the treaties about which the Chinese are most bitter are two that were signed with Czarist Russia—the Treaty of Aigun of May 1858, and the Treaty of Peking of November 1860. These treaties ceded over 500,000 square miles of territory to the

¹Robert P. Martin, "Where Danger Grows on a 4,500 Mile Border," U. S. News and World Report, Vol. 59, 6 Dec. 1965, p. 44.

Russians.² This area included the Amur River basin, Vladivostok, and the Pacific littoral of Siberia.³ These pacts, in the eyes of the Chinese, fall in the category of "unfair" or "unequal treaties." As Mao Tse-tung announced in the summer of 1964, "We have not yet presented the bill for this account."⁴ Ironically, the territorial question is nothing new. During the Republican period (1911-1949), the Chinese made similar and even more sweeping claims as evidenced by a map published in Shanghai in 1925. (Annex D) In 1954, a Chinese textbook on modern history published by the Chinese showed large areas of the Soviet Union as "rightfully" belonging to China.⁵ This map, plus those published subsequently by the Chinese, show the border on the northern frontier running along the Stanovik Mountain Range, cutting off the Maritime Provinces of the USSR. In the west, parts of Kirghizia, Tadzhikistan, and Kazakhstan up to Lake Balkash are also included as Chinese territory, as is Sakhalin. (Annex E) Since 1961, most Chinese maps show the Sino-Soviet border as "still to be delimited," and they include parts of present-day Soviet territory within the Chinese borders.

²"A Comment on the Statement of the Communist Party of the USA," editorial, Jenmin Jih-Pao, Peking, 8 Mar. 1963, as cited by Dennis J. Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict, pp. 29-31.

³Martin, op. cit., p. 46.

⁴Henry Tanner and David Bender, "Moscow Leaders Termed Weaker in Rift with China," New York Times, 14 Mar. 1966, p. E-5.

⁵Doolin, op. cit., p. 15.

The Soviet Union claims legal possession of these territories by virtue of negotiated treaties. Soviet maps show the Sino-Soviet border to be properly delimited. The Treaty of Chuguchak in 1864 ceded present Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, and Tadzhikstan to Imperial Russia. The Pamirs were secretly divided between England and Russia in 1896. The Treaty of Aigun in May, 1858, granted Russia all the territory north (left bank) of the Amur River, about 185,000 square miles of territory. The Peking Treaty in November, 1860, ceded to Russia the area east of the Ussuri and large portions of the Ili region of Chinese Turkestan. This treaty encompassed some 350,000 square miles of territory, including the site of Vladivostok. This was the treaty that enabled the Russians to expand to the Pacific Ocean. (Annex F) The Treaty of Ili (or St. Petersburg), signed in February 1881, permitted the establishment of boundaries at Ili (August 1882), Kashgar (November 1882), Kobdo and Tarbagatai (July 1883), and Kashgar again (May 1885). In each delimitation, China lost some territory. (Annex G)

In 1911, Outer Mongolia, with Russian support, declared its independence of the Chinese Empire. In 1944, the Tuvian Oblast (northwest area of Outer Mongolia) was incorporated into the USSR. This event was followed by the Soviet takeover of Sakhalin and the Kuriles after World War II.

China reportedly repudiated the 1954 map in 1963. Nevertheless, the Chinese distributed a booklet at a 1964 trade fair in Mexico City that contained a map which continued to show the

Soviet Maritime Provinces as part of China.⁶ The Chinese, early in 1964, had taken the position that frontier treaties inherited by PRC should be settled by negotiations and, that pending such settlement, the status quo should be maintained.⁷ However, Chinese representatives continue to mention with increasing frequency the hundreds of thousands of square kilometers of Soviet territory which allegedly belong "by right" to China.

Border provocations continue. The Chinese claim that the Soviets have made frequent breaches of the status quo on the borders, have occupied Chinese territory, have provoked border incidents, and are continuing a policy of territorial expansion.⁸ On 20 September 1963, the Soviets reported that, since 1960, border violations have been committed by Chinese military and civilian personnel. Further, that in 1962, more than 5,000 violations occurred on the Sino-Soviet border.⁹ The Soviets again accused the Chinese in 1964 of publishing maps that, since 1954, have shown as Chinese territory, not only large tracts of Soviet territory, but also areas in Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaya, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim as well.¹⁰ The Soviet Union regards

⁶"Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," China Quarterly, No. 18, April-June 1964, p. 241.

⁷Doolin, op. cit.

⁸"Letter of the Central Committee of the CPC of February 29, 1964 to the Central Committee of the CPSU," Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 19, 8 May 1964.

⁹Dispatch from Tass International Service, Pravda, 19 Sep. 1964, p. 1.

¹⁰Editorial, Pravda, 2 Sep. 1964, p. 2.

all her borders as inviolable and sacred. Her official position is that the present borders have been developed historically and that the treaties which established these borders cannot be disregarded.¹¹ Communist China apparently does not agree.

SIBERIA AND THE SOVIET FAR EAST

The transformation of Communist China into a world power focuses attention on the importance of Siberia and the Soviet Far East. The southern flank of the USSR, directly contiguous to China, acquires new significance. The emergence of China as a potential threat has forced the Soviet Union to look upon Soviet Asia as a single complex. Vast natural resources such as minerals, hydroelectric power, three-quarters of all Soviet coal reserves, over 12 billion tons of iron ore, non-ferrous metals, gold, diamonds, oil, and three-quarters of the Soviet timber reserves are all located there. Enormous distances, severe climate, poor communications, permafrost, and low population density combine to hinder exploitation of these resources. This unquestionably would make a tempting target for a hostile and growing China which, faced with the impracticality of settling its people in its central and western regions, would be forced to look either north (Soviet Asia) or south (India, Indochina) for expansion. The Soviet Union has taken steps during the past five years to strengthen her position. Between

¹¹Dispatch from Tass International Service, Pravda, 19 Sep. 1964, p. 1.

1959 and 1964 almost 30 per cent of all capital investments of the Soviet Union went to Siberia and the Far East. Early in 1966, a Japanese-Soviet Joint Economic Commission started negotiations for the industrial expansion of Siberia on mutually agreeable terms as a means of accelerating the development of this area.¹²

Medium-range rocket sites have been constructed in the Maritime Provinces and along the border with Chinese Turkestan in Central Asia. Such sites could only have Mainland China as their targets. By 1965, a noticeable build-up of Soviet military potential had occurred in Siberia and the Soviet Far East. In the face of such strategic measures, any overt action against Siberia and the Soviet Far East by the Communist Chinese is highly unlikely under the present conditions. The USSR has taken strategic measures to secure her Asian frontiers. She is ensuring the systematic development of her Asian territory by her own means and with Japanese assistance. This will provide her with a self-sufficiency in the Far East in the event of a large-scale war and permit her to conduct an offensive from this area should it become necessary to do so.

UNITED NATIONS PROPOSAL

As a means of perhaps placing Communist China on the defensive internationally, on 22 September 1964, the Soviet

¹²"Japan Studies Deal to Develop Siberia," New York Times, 24 Mar. 1966, p. 65.

Union submitted to the United Nations a proposal on the peaceful settlement of border disputes. The proposal, "On the Renunciation by States of the Use of Force for Settling Territorial and Frontier Disputes," had not been acted upon by the General Assembly as of February 1965, but it had been circulated as an official UN document. The Soviet Union is now on record that she is the champion of peace but, if attacked, will defend her borders with all means at her disposal. There can be no misunderstanding this message from the irritated Russians.

Since the ouster of Premier Krushchev in October 1964, the Chinese Communists have listed the territorial dispute as one of key events leading to his downfall. The territorial problems are expected to remain important. Considering the power balance between these two Communist giants, it appears unlikely that the smoke generated between them in their debates over territorial questions, will, in themselves, erupt into a fire in the foreseeable future. There is too much at stake for both nations to dissipate their energies solely on such issues.

CHAPTER 10

BORDER STATES

Traditionally, Chinese policy has always been to discourage the overdevelopment of the border territories. She has preferred to put a belt of quasi-desert between China and her potential enemies. The Russians, on the other hand, have always disliked frontier lines that are difficult to defend, and their policy for centuries has been to maintain a chain of well-disposed buffer states along the frontiers. This has been particularly so in the case of the sparsely populated Siberian possessions and the teeming Chinese millions.¹

MONGOLIA

The Peoples' Republic of Mongolia, formerly Outer Mongolia, with an area of 626,000 square miles and a population of 1.1 million,² has been a pawn in the political and military machinations of both countries for centuries. Russia's treaty with Japan in 1907 gave Russia a free hand in Outer Mongolia, although nominal Chinese suzerainty was retained there. After the fall of the Manchus in 1911, Russia penetrated into Outer Mongolia when it became an autonomous province within China. Mongolia was declared a Soviet-type republic in 1921. The Sino-Soviet Agreement on

¹James Vivian Davidson-Houston, Russia and China, p. 84.

²Jesse H. Wheeler, Jr., and others, Regional Geography of the World, p. 392.

General Principles in 1924 recognized Mongolia's autonomy under Chinese sovereignty. Subsequent increasing Soviet political penetration, during a period when China was busily involved in her own domestic problems, resulted in the establishment of Outer Mongolia as one of the first Soviet puppet states. In 1945 China renounced her claims to Outer Mongolia—claims made since the seventeenth century—and, in agreement with the Soviet Union, agreed to the holding of a plebescite on 20 October 1945. On the basis of a 98.4 per cent vote in favor of independence, Mongolia was established and recognized as independent on 5 January 1946.³ Since that time, both countries have been actively cultivating friendly relations—the Soviets, to maintain Mongolia's security as a buffer state; the Chinese, to loosen Soviet monopoly and increase China's own political and economic influence in Mongolia. The prelude to the Sino-Soviet dispute may well have occurred in 1954 when a Soviet delegation to Peking was confronted with demands that Mongolia be returned to Chinese ownership. The Soviets, at that time, reaffirmed their position that Mongolia was an independent country.⁴

The Soviets continue to exercise a dominant economic influence. Seventy per cent of Mongolia's foreign trade is with the Soviet Union, and Mongolia runs a trade deficit which

³Davidson-Houston, op. cit., p. 154.

⁴Harry Schwartz, "Moscow-Peking Dispute: A Decade of Bitterness," New York Times, 24 Mar. 1966, p. 17.

the Soviets periodically forgive. This assistance is in addition to \$140 per person per year in economic aid, the highest per capita that the Soviets give to any country. The Soviet Union also subsidizes a large Mongolian government, and there are 5,000 Soviet laborers building factories and apartments in Mongolia.⁵

The East European Communist states—East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland—are building factories at Darkhan; Hungary is drilling oil wells in the Gobi; and Bulgaria is launching an aid program in Mongolia.

In 1958, under Soviet pressure and guidance, the Mongolian language was Romanized. The Mongolian Peoples' Republic joined the Soviet-controlled Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), Europe-oriented, in June 1962, the only Asian member to be included to date.

On 15 January 1966, Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union signed a 20-year mutual assistance pact in Ulan Bator, which is a prolongation of an existing 20-year treaty that was scheduled to expire in February 1966. While the details were not announced, the treaty does provide for technical and cultural cooperation and includes mutual security arrangements.⁶ The new treaty is particularly significant in view of the fact that Outer Mongolia, a former province of the Chinese empire, has been firmly aligned

⁵Fox Butterfield, "China's Getting its Claws into Mongolia," Washington Post, 12 Dec. 1965, p. E-5.

⁶Peter Grose, "Mongolia Affirms Unity with Soviet," New York Times, 16 Jan. 1966, p. 1.

with the USSR in the ideological dispute with Communist China. The treaty is also significant because of Mongolia's strategic position on the Chinese northern frontier.

Leonid Brezhnev, in making reference to the treaty, declared that both sides would "take all necessary measures including military ones in insuring the independence and territorial integrity of both countries."⁷

China is the only nation which is physically capable of directly threatening the borders of landlocked Mongolia. The warning, therefore, could apply realistically only to China.

The Chinese, historically, have been the Mongol's enemies since the time of Ghenghis Khan. In 1936 Mao Tse-tung announced that Outer Mongolia "will eventually be federated with a Peoples' China." There is little evidence to show that the Chinese objective has changed. Like the Soviets, they are also helping in the development of Mongolia, probably with the same motives in mind. The Chinese have constructed a hotel, a department store, and some housing projects in Ulan Bator and have infiltrated the countryside with their products. The border of the Mongolian Peoples' Republic with Communist China was delimited by agreement in December 1962.⁸

While Soviet influence is predominant in Mongolia and pro-Soviet leaders are in power, the Chinese have won many converts

⁷"Soviet Warning Seen in Pact with China," Washington Post, 20 Jan. 1966, p. A-14.

⁸"Boundary Agreement Between China and Pakistan," Peking Review, Vol. VI, No. 11, 15 Mar. 1963, pp. 67-70.

inside the Communist Party and in the government. There is little doubt that China and the Soviet Union will continue to compete actively for Mongolia's allegiance. Mongolia can be expected to continue to exploit her position in relationship to both states in maintaining her own independence. From China's viewpoint, the question of legitimacy of claims concerning Mongolia is a long-range matter.

OTHER DISPUTED AREAS

Tanmu Tuva, which had been a titular part of China for centuries, was occupied by Russia in 1911 and was made a protectorate. In 1921 the protectorate ceased and the country became nominally independent. However, in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945, China abandoned claim to the area which was then incorporated into the USSR. This, in effect, gave the Soviets control of the Yenisey headwaters and all the potential mineral wealth located within this territory and control over several important routes into Mongolia.⁹

Sinkiang, although now formally ruled by China as an autonomous region—"Sinkiang Uigur Autonomous Region"—has been a debatable territory between China and Russia. The Soviets remain interested in Sinkiang, traditionally within their sphere of influence, from which they have been excluded by China. Covering an area of about 700,000 square miles with a population of

⁹Roy E. H. Mellor, Geography of the USSR, p. 99.

4.9 million, Sinkiang contains several peoples with ethnic relatives in Soviet Central Asia.¹⁰ In 1955, less than 10 per cent of the people of Sinkiang were Chinese, 74 per cent were Turkish-speaking Uigurs, and the remainder belonged to minorities such as the Kirghiz, Mongol, and Tadjik.¹¹ Several important motor highways connect Lanchow in northwestern China proper with railheads in Soviet Middle Asia and a railway along the northern tier of the Tien Shan (Kirghiz SSR). These factors tend to draw this area into the economic orbit of the USSR.

Soviet interests in Manchuria have been associated with the Chinese Eastern Railway and the naval and port facilities at Dairen-Port Arthur. Manchuria is the site of an important rail junction at Harbin where the railroad from Shenyang intersects the Russian-built east-west line connecting Vladivostok with the Trans-Siberian line east of Lake Baikal. Russian interest in this territory was aroused by Japanese activity there in the 1930's, which threatened the gateway from Manchuria to Transbaykalia. After defeating the Japanese in Manchuria in 1945, the Soviets occupied the territory for a time. They held a concession in the Liaotung Peninsula until 1955, when Soviet forces were withdrawn. This potentially rich and strategically located area will continue to be the focus of attention of both powers for some time to come.

¹⁰Wheeler, op. cit., p. 390.

¹¹Davidson-Houston, op. cit., p. 177

Korea is of strategic interest to both the Soviet Union and Communist China, particularly since the Korean War in 1953. Both countries have direct rail links with North Korea and are providing technical and economic assistance. Both countries can be expected to continue their attempts to exert the dominant influence in North Korea from both a strategic and political point of view.

The Sino-Soviet frontier and the countries and regions contiguous with this frontier will receive increased attention and interest in Sino-Soviet disputes and deliberations. History reveals that the USSR must base its security of Siberia on either a friendly or neutralized China and the nations on its periphery in Asia. Extension of China's influence and authority into these areas directly affects Soviet strategy in the Far East. Conversely, China can derive significant political and economic advantage by eliminating Soviet influence. Both countries can be expected to accelerate the achievement of their objectives in the peripheral state.

CHAPTER 11

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

The examination and assessment of the power factors lead to certain definitive conclusions as they affect the frequently conflicting realities of China's power and her national ambitions. China, under Mao Tse-tung, has again become a relatively strong power, partly as a result of initial Soviet assistance. But in their climb to power, the Chinese leaders have also accumulated many grievances against the USSR. They have not forgotten the shabby treatment which they suffered at Stalin's hands before, during, and after World War II and in the Korean War. They recall vividly Krushchev's de-Stalinization program and his revisionist policies which started in February 1956 and threatened the very existence of the Communist regime in China. They will long remember the failure of the USSR to support China's attempt to seize the off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu in 1958. They were angered by the withdrawal of Soviet technicians and specialists in 1960. The Soviet action in supporting India in the Chinese attack on India's border regions in October 1962 was a stunning blow to the Communist Chinese. The significance of the diplomatic success of the Soviets in bringing together the heads of government of India and Pakistan at a conference in Tashkent, USSR, in January 1966, was not lost on the Chinese leaders. These and other related events have contributed to the growing antagonism between Communist China and the USSR,

which has become a powerful and consistent factor in world politics. The policies, objectives, and strategy which the leaders of Communist China adopt in their relations with the Soviet Union affect the ratio of power and the stability of these and other countries in many parts of the globe. The most important question of concern here is whether the Soviet Union is a threat to the Peoples' Republic of China. The answer is found in the conclusions which follow.

STABILITY

The Communist regime in China has succeeded for the first time in restoring peace to a country that historically has always been in turmoil. The Communists have also succeeded in unifying the people, in attaining some degree of modernization, and in working to restore China's traditional domination of East Asia. The government's political control over the people today is the most effective in China's history. Since 1958, however, China has been acting as an imperialist power, and has caused alarm throughout Asia. While this imperialist attitude has affected her external relations, there is no evidence that she cannot maintain internal control of the country. The Tibetan revolt in 1958-59 and the uprising among minority races in the border province of Sinkiang in 1962 were quelled with little effort. The internal security of the Soviet government has not been threatened in any way, and her stability is not a matter of question. The conclusion is that the Communist governments

in the Peoples' Republic of China and the USSR are firmly entrenched in power. Barring a major upheaval that has significant external support, there is no reason to believe that the respective Communist governments will not be able to continue to control and govern China and the USSR in the foreseeable future.

SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

The Sino-Soviet dispute, which has continued hot and cold since 1956, is affecting the unity of the Communist world. While the Chinese are still developing as a nation, the Soviets have reached and passed this critical point. Nevertheless, China feels strong enough to challenge the USSR for influence in the world Communist movement. Although such a challenge was neither intended by the Chinese nor anticipated by the Soviets, it was inherent in the emergence of a second power within the single ideological movement. The Communist movement depends on a single authority to interpret doctrine. With two power centers, each makes pronouncements inconsistent with the other. The alternatives in such a case are for one or the other either to surrender its power position or to proclaim its independence of world Communism, as did Yugoslavia. With the rise of nationalism, the monolithic global Communism seems to be fading into history. Communist China may well decide to go her own independent way as a Communist state. Should this occur, it would force the leaders of both states to carry out policies in an international environment which would be far more complicated and far less

predictable than ever before. The dispute and differences notwithstanding, both Communist China and the USSR have too many interests in common to permit their ideological cleavage to go to the extreme of a military confrontation. Under existing leadership, however, the chances of restoring the relationship which existed prior to the start of the Sino-Soviet dispute in 1956, is remote and unlikely. As long as the "Long March" veterans are alive, the ideological dispute between the PRC and the USSR will continue and probably increase in intensity. In the final analysis, the dispute does not question Communist objectives but only how to attain them. It is this argument that creates the danger for the rest of the world.

POLITICAL

The Chinese see the need for preventing Soviet encroachment in China's sphere of interest and for maintaining Chinese influence in the peripheral states on the rimland of South and Southeast Asia. The Chinese regard the Soviet Union as traditionally a European nation, both historically and politically, and as having no reason to participate in Afro-Asian affairs. China is attempting by every means to prevent a USSR-US detente and simultaneously to achieve Chinese domination and control over the Communist parties within the Communist camp and in developing nations. China's ultimate political goal is to establish the Peoples' Republic of China as the dominant power and leader in Asia and in the developing world. By subverting Soviet leadership

throughout the world, discrediting Soviet foreign aid and assistance programs, the Chinese hope to expand China's influence at the expense of the USSR. Unfortunately, Communist China's reckless behavior and dangerous diplomacy has alienated many socialist and non-aligned states. This, coupled with a calculated shift in Soviet policy, has resulted in a containment of China. Until Chinese strategy is changed and her national power built up to a reasonable level, China's power position in Asia will continue to be challenged. Accordingly, Sino-Soviet relationships are likely to continue to deteriorate because of racial, economic, sociological, territorial, and national differences.

Recognizing the realities of China's power and her national ambitions, the Chinese will probably increase anti-Soviet nationalism within China and develop a "China first" philosophy at home within the framework of the Chinese brand of Communism. They can be expected to establish friendly relations with Asian nations, including the negotiation of mutual security treaties oriented against the USSR and the US, and to play the USSR against the US in matters relating to Japan, Taiwan, Indo-China, and India. They will accelerate efforts to subvert Soviet leadership in the Warsaw Pact countries and intensify support for wars of national liberation in developing countries along lines favorable to China. Within this context, an independent Chinese Communist state, not unlike Albania or Yugoslavia, going its own way and picking its own friends without Soviet pressures, appears to be the trend for the future. Finally, increased competition is

envisioned for influence and control in North Vietnam and the adjacent areas in Southeast Asia, for Japanese trade, and for control of the Communist parties in Japan, Korea, and other peripheral areas. Such competition can well include denunciations of Soviet aid as imperialist and colonialist, with stress on the racial distinction between the white European Russians and the yellow Asiatics.

ECONOMIC

Both states have economic problems, albeit of a different nature. There is no comparison between the respective economies. The Soviets have developed their resources to a high degree in all areas and are considered to be one of the first-rate, modern industrial centers of the world. Communist China's resources have yet to be fully developed; her industry is third-rate and, while improving, is still in the primitive stage of development. Nevertheless, although her national economy was already operating under great strain, China implemented a costly atomic weapons program, thereby placing priority for development of military power at the initial expense of economic growth. Her disastrous loss of Soviet economic aid and assistance in 1960 set back her economic development by five years or more. Food shortages have been critical for the past few years. China is two decades or more behind the USSR in industrial and economic capacity. She cannot support a "guns and butter" economy. She does not have the economic capability to support an extended modern war without outside

assistance and reinforcement. China's disastrous experience with the Soviet Union has made her realize that she cannot rely on any single nation to help her to achieve national economic growth. Blocked from any move to the north, Communist China will be forced to look to the south where food resources are the best in Asia. Economic pressures in this direction will continue. To survive as a nation, China is forced to expand and to diversify her world trade by taking advantage of the capitalist countries' competition for markets and to develop Chinese "self-reliance" in the world economy. China's industrial capacity in the future will depend on her ability to cultivate foreign trade relations with other countries of the world. Until China is able to achieve major power status as a nation, priority will be given for accelerating military production at the expense of the civil economy. Despite economic deficiencies at home, the Chinese will, for political as well as economic reasons, be forced to compete with the USSR, albeit at a reduced scale, in the foreign aid field in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. They can be expected to discredit Soviet foreign aid to developing countries, while expanding their own assistance and support. With Cuba as an example, such aid could well develop into economic warfare for political gain.

MILITARY

Although China has a large regular armed force supported by a militia and is developing an atomic weapons capability,

her leaders realize that this conventional, non-nuclear force is no match for the modern, sophisticated Soviet military power. China would be extremely vulnerable in a war in which tactical or strategic nuclear weapons were employed. By sheer manpower alone, China can certainly defend her borders against a conventional attack. She can conduct limited operations on her periphery against non-nuclear forces. Her present industrial base will not support extended military operations, but modernization, now in progress, will improve her offensive and defensive capability. China's defense-oriented forces cannot be compared to the increasingly sophisticated, nuclear might of the offense-oriented Soviet forces. Her embryonic atomic capability does give her a limited deterrence posture, however, which she can use in the form of direct or indirect nuclear blackmail to support revolution and insurrection.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

By Soviet standards, Communist China's science and technology is still in the primitive stage. Although she has exploded only two atomic test bombs to date and is preparing to test the third, probably an H-bomb, this year, China does have the resources and the capability that she needs to produce nuclear and thermonuclear bombs within the next four years. The USSR, on the other hand, has launched sophisticated weapons and space vehicles, and has a formidable nuclear weapons arsenal for ground, naval, and air forces. The Chinese are making some

significant advances in military science and technology as a priority program of the government but they have a long way to go before the level of their scientific proficiency reaches that presently to be found in the Soviet Union.

TERRITORIAL

Historical territorial questions will continue to plague both nations. China's avowed intention to recover the border territory that was previously hers, but now is held by the Soviet Union by conquest and treaty, threatens the frontier integrity of these Communist giants. Each country is giving increasing attention to the security of its border areas. It is inconceivable that the USSR would voluntarily surrender any of the border territory that separates her from China. Their respective power postures and political attitudes preclude any possibility that either one would attempt to resolve territorial questions by force. The leaders of China can be expected to press for a delimitation of this border to realign the frontiers in the Maritime Provinces along lines more favorable to China. Continued propaganda claims that the territory belongs to China, coupled with the theme of "Soviet imperialism," can be anticipated. Efforts will continue to restore the Peoples' Republic of Mongolia to China's sphere of influence and to infiltrate Mongolia politically and economically. Because of Chinese pragmatism and the recognition by their leaders of their

military and economic power limitations, a military confrontation over the disputed Soviet territory along China's northern border and the buffer state is unlikely.

THE THREAT

The Chinese leaders do not see the USSR as a serious threat to Communist China's national security. The Soviet strength and position on the Eurasian land mass gives the USSR a favorable strategic posture in relation to China. However, the Soviets are more concerned about dealing with their own domestic problems and exercising a strong influence on world issues than in seeking to take on the problems of a growing and militant China. A nuclear armed China unquestionably will change the attitudes and relationships of both nations. Until this occurs, an armed conflict between these two states is considered unlikely. What is likely during this period is the possibility that, should the integrity of the Communist government in the Peoples' Republic of China be threatened by external enemies, the USSR would probably intervene to preserve the Communist state.

While mistakes have been made, the leaders of Communist China are not likely, at this relatively early stage of development, to make a miscalculation serious enough to destroy them. Their experience in history is too fresh in their minds. There is no doubt that the Peoples' Republic of China is well on the road to becoming a major world power. Her influence will be felt increasingly in Asia and throughout the world.

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
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
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
ANNEX A


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


















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• 5376 Spot height (in feet)




ANNEX C

SINO-SOVIET TRADE¹
1950-1963
(Millions of Dollars)


Year	Soviet Exports To China	Soviet Imports From China
1950	388.2	191.3
1951	476.3	331.9
1952	550.2	413.7
1953	705.5	474.7
1954	759.3	578.3
1955	748.3	643.5
1956	733.0	764.2
1957	544.1	738.1
1958	634.0	881.3
1959	954.6	1100.3
1960	816.3	847.3
1961	367.0	550.9
1962	233.2	515.8
1963	187.0	412.6

¹Harry Schwartz, The Soviet Economy Since Stalin, p. 218.

母 斷 故 無 士 靈 廣 司



MAP 2: "The Old Democratic Revolutionary Era (1840-1919) – Chinese Territories Taken by Imperialism."
 From Liu P'ei-hua, ed., *Chung-kuo chin-tai chien-shih*, (A Short History of Modern China), (Peking: Ich'ang shu chu, 1954), following p. 253. Key numbers added for the present book.






KEY TO MAP 2

(Translation of the information given in boxes on the map.)

1. The Great Northwest: seized by Imperial Russia under the Treaty of Chuguchak, 1864. [Parts of present Soviet Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, and Tadzhikistan.]
2. Pamirs: secretly divided between England and Russia in 1896.
3. Nepal: went to England after "independence" in 1898.
4. Sikkim: occupied by England in 1889.
5. Bhutan: went to England after "independence" in 1865.
6. Assam: given to England by Burma in 1826.
7. Burma: became part of the British Empire in 1886.
8. Andaman Archipelago: went to England.
9. Malaya: occupied by England in 1895.
10. Thailand: declared "independent" under joint Anglo-French control in 1904.
11. Annam: occupied by France in 1885. [Covers present North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.]
12. Taiwan and P'eng-hu Archipelago [Pescadores]: relinquished to Japan per the Treaty of Shimonoseki, 1895.
13. Sulu Archipelago: went to England.
14. Region where the British crossed the border and committed aggression.
15. Ryukyu Archipelago: occupied by Japan in 1879.
16. Korea: "independent" in 1895—annexed by Japan in 1910.
17. The Great Northeast: seized by Imperial Russia under the Treaty of Aigun, 1858.
18. The Great Northeast: seized by Imperial Russia under the Treaty of Peking, 1860.
19. Sakhalin: divided between Russia and Japan.

The map displays the Klamath River watershed, with the river itself highlighted in a thick black line. The watershed is divided into various land use zones, including forested areas, marshes, cultivated land, and barren land. Mineral resources are indicated by symbols: Coal (solid black circle), Iron (open circle), Permalite (open triangle), Tin (open square), and Lead/Zinc (open diamond). The map also shows the Klamath Dam and the Klamath Falls. The legend is located in the bottom right corner, titled "VEGETATION-MINERAL RESOURCES".

VEGETATION-MINERAL RESOURCES	
Forest	Coal
Marsh	Iron
Cultivated	Permalite
Barren	Tin
	Lead/Zinc



CHINA-U.S.S.R. BORDER: WESTERN SECTOR

